Category Archives: Medicaid Recipient Appeals

Medicaid Closed Networks: Can Waivers Waive Your Legal Rights?

Dec 9

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Sorry for the lapse in blogging. I took off for Thanksgiving and then got sick. I hope you all had a wonderful Thanksgiving!!

While I was sick, I thought about all the health care providers that have been put out of business because the managed care organization (MCO) in their area terminated their Medicaid contract or refused to contract with them. I thought about how upset I would be if I could not see my doctor, whom I have seen for years. See blog for “You Do Have Rights!”

Then I thought about…Can a Waiver waive a legal right?

Federal law mandates that Medicaid recipients be able to choose their providers of choice. Court have also held that this “freedom of choice” of provider is a right, not a privilege.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a states that Medicaid recipients may obtain medical services from “any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required… who undertakes to provide him such services….” Id. at (a)(23).

So how can these MCOs restrict access?

First, we need to discuss the difference between a right and a privilege.

For example, driving is a privilege, not a right. You have no right to a driver’s license, which is why you can lose your license for things, such as multiple DUIs. Plus, you cannot receive a driver’s license unless you pass a test, because a license is not a right.

Conversely, you have the right to free speech and the right to vote. Meaning, the government cannot infringe on your rights to speak and vote unless there are extraordinary circumstances. For example, the First Amendment does not protect obscenity, child pornography, true threats, fighting words, incitement to imminent lawless action (yelling “fire” in a crowded theater), criminal solicitation or defamation. Your right to vote will be rescinded if you are convicted of a felony. Furthermore, you do not need to take a test or qualify for the rights of free speech and voting.

Likewise, your choice of health care provider is a right. It can only be usurped in extraordinary circumstances. You do not need to take a test or qualify for the right. (Ok, I am going to stop underlining “right” and “privilege” now. You get the point).

Then how are MCOs operating closed networks? For that matter, how can Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) terminate a provider’s contract? Wouldn’t both those actions limit your right to choose your provider?

The answer is yes.

And the answer is simple for BCBS. As for BCBS, it is a private company and does not have to follow all the intricate regulations for Medicare/caid. 42 U.S.C.  § 1396a is inapplicable to it.

But Medicaid recipients have the right to choose their provider.  This “freedom of choice” provision has been interpreted by both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit as giving Medicaid recipients the right to choose among a range of qualified providers, without government interference (or its agents thereof).

What does this mean? How can a managed care organization (MCO) here in NC maintain a closed network of providers without violating the freedom of choice of provider rule?

The “Stepford” answer is that we have our Waivers in NC, which have waived the freedom of choice. In our 1915 b/c Waiver, there are a couple pages that enumerates certain statutes. We “x” out the statutes that we were requesting to waive.

It looks like this:

waiver1

Furthermore, federal law carves out an exception to freedom to choose right when it comes to managed care. But to what extent? It the federal carve unconstitutional?

But…the question is twofold:

  • Would our Waiver stand up to federal court scrutiny?
  • Can our state government waive your rights? (I couldn’t help it).

Let’s think of this in the context of the freedom of speech. Could NC request from the federal government a waiver of our right to free speech? It sounds ludicrous, doesn’t it? What is the difference between your right to free speech and your right to choose a provider? Is one right more important than the other?

The answer is that no one has legally challenged our Waiver’s waiver of the right to freedom of provider with a federal lawsuit claiming a violation of a constitutionally protected right. It could be successful. If so, in my opinion, two legal theories should be used.

  1. A § 1983 action; and/or
  2. A challenge under 42 CFR 431.55(f)

Section 1983 creates a federal remedy against anyone who deprives “any citizen of the United States… of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has explained that § 1983 should be read to generally “authorize[] suits to enforce individual rights under federal statutes as well as the Constitution.” City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119 (2005).

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal remedy against state interference with all government entitlements, however; “it is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced under the authority of that section.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). But the courts have already held that the freedom to choose your provider is a right.

In 2012, the Seventh Circuit confirmed that § 1983 authorizes Medicaid recipients to sue to enforce the right to freely choose among qualified health providers.

In Planned Parenthood, the court was confronted with an Indiana state law prohibiting state agencies from providing state or federal funds to any entity that performs abortions or maintains or operates a facility in which abortions are performed – regardless of whether there is any nexus between those funds and the abortion services. See Planned Parenthood, 699 F.3d at 967 (7th Cir. 2012). In other words, the law effectively prohibited entities that perform abortions from receiving any state or federal funds for any (non-abortion) purpose.

The Court found that the restrictions violated the Medicaid recipients’ right to freedom of choice of provider.

There are, as always, more than one way to skin a cat. You could also attack the Waiver’s waiver of the freedom to choose your health care provider by saying the NC is violating 42 CFR 431.55.

Notice the last sentence in subsection (d) in the picture above. In our Waiver, NC promises to abide by 42 CFR 431.55(f), which states:

(f) Restriction of freedom of choice—
(1) Waiver of appropriate requirements of section 1902 of the Act may be authorized for States to restrict beneficiaries to obtaining services from (or through) qualified providers or practitioners that meet, accept, and comply with the State reimbursement, quality and utilization standards specified in the State’s waiver request.
(2) An agency may qualify for a waiver under this paragraph (f) only if its applicable State standards are consistent with access, quality and efficient and economic provision of covered care and services and the restrictions it imposes—
(i) Do not apply to beneficiaries residing at a long-term care facility when a restriction is imposed unless the State arranges for reasonable and adequate beneficiary transfer.
(ii) Do not discriminate among classes of providers on grounds unrelated to their demonstrated effectiveness and efficiency in providing those services; and
(iii) Do not apply in emergency circumstances.
(3) Demonstrated effectiveness and efficiency refers to reducing costs or slowing the rate of cost increase and maximizing outputs or outcomes per unit of cost.
(4) The agency must make payments to providers furnishing services under a freedom of choice waiver under this paragraph (f) in accordance with the timely claims payment standards specified in § 447.45 of this chapter for health care practitioners participating in the Medicaid program.

Basically, to argue a violation of 42 CFR 431.55, you would have to demonstrate that NC violated or is violating the above regulation by not providing services “consistent with access, quality and efficient and economic provision of covered care and services.”

So, while it is true that NC has requested and received permission from the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to restrict access to providers, that fact may not be constitutional.

Someone just needs to challenge the Waiver’s waiver.

Posted in "Single State Agency", 1915 b/c Waiver, Access to Care, Administrative Remedies, Affordable Care Act, Alliance, Appeal Rights, Behavioral health, Cardinal Innovations, CenterPoint, Division of Medical Assistance, Due process, EastPointe, ECBH, Federal Government, Federal Law, Health Care Providers and Services, Knicole Emanuel, Lawsuit, Legal Analysis, Legal Remedies for Medicaid Providers, Legislation, Managed Care, MCO, MeckLINK, Medicaid, Medicaid Advocate, Medicaid Attorney, Medicaid Providers, Medicaid Recipient Appeals, Medicaid Recipients, Medicaid Reimbursement, Medicaid Services, Medicare, Medicare Attorney, NC, NC DHHS, North Carolina, Provider Appeals of Adverse Decisions for Medicare and Medicaid, Psychiatrists, Psychologists, Trillium

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General Assembly in Full Swing: What Medicaid Bills Are On the Agenda??

May 22

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It’s that time of year again. The legislators are back in town. Moral Mondays resume. And all eyes are on the General Assembly. But, this is the short session, and the General Statutes limit the powers of legislative law-making in the short session.

For those of you who do not know how our General Assembly (GA) works and the difference between the short and long sessions, let me explain:

In odd-numbered years, the GA meets in January and continues until it adjourns. There is no requirement as to the length of the long session, but it is normally about 6 months. In the long session, everything is fair game. New laws or changes to the existing laws can be proposed in long sessions for all of the subjects on which the GA legislates.

The short session reconvenes every even-numbered year and typically lasts 6 weeks. Last year the long session adjourned July 26, 2013, and the GA reconvened May 14, 2014.

There are limits as to what measures may be considered in the short session. In fact, at the end of the long session, the GA passed Resolution 2013-23, which states exactly what topics/bills may be considered in the short session.

So…the question is: What Medicaid bills may be considered during this short session?

H0674
H0867
H0320

Now there are of course, exceptions. For example, any bill that directly and primarily affects the State Budget can be introduced. Obviously, a Medicaid bill could, arguably, directly and primarily affect the budget.

The bills I enumerated above, however, are the bills that are allowed to be considered in the short session because they constitute a crossover bill, that is, these bills were passed one house and were received in the other during last year’s long session and are considered “still alive” for consideration during the current short session.

So what do these Medicaid bills propose?

House Bill 674 could be a game changer for Medicaid providers. The bill, which passed the House last year with a vote of 116-0, would direct the Program Evaluation Division to study the contested case process in regards to Medicaid providers. There are 3 key components in this study according to the bill:

1. The Division must review the procedures for a contested case hearing under NCGS 150B and determine whether there is a way to streamline the process and decrease backlog.
2. The Division must consider alternative methods of review other than the contested cases.
3. The Division must review NCGS 108C-12 to determine whether any amendments to the law would improve the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the Medicaid appeal process. (NCGS 108C-12 is the statute that allows providers to appeal adverse decisions to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)).

Whew. The Program Evaluation Division would have its work cut out for it if the bill passes!

House Bill 674 was received by the Senate on May 5, 2013, and it passed its first reading.

House Bill 867 is named “An Act to Allow for the Movement of Certain Medicaid Recipients,” and it purports to allow those recipients with an 1915(c) Innovations Waiver slot to move about the State and for the slots to be recognized uniformly across the State. This way a person with an Innovations Waiver would not need to re-apply in another county if he or she moves there. However, for those served by the managed care organizations (MCOs), residency is determined by the county in which the recipient currently resides.

Then we come to House Bill 320. See my blog,”HB320: The Good News and the Bad News for NC Medicaid Providers.”

House Bill 320 mainly speaks to Medicaid recipient appeals, but imbedded within the language is one tiny proposed change to NCGS 108C-1. Just an itty, bitty change.

NCGS 108C-1 provides the scope of 108C (which applies to providers) and currently reads, “This Chapter applies to providers enrolled in Medicaid or Health Choice.”

If House Bill 320 passes, NCGS 108C-1 will read, “This Chapter applies to providers enrolled in Medicaid or Health Choice. Except as expressly provided by law, this Chapter does not apply to LME/MCOs, enrollees, applicants, providers of emergency services, or network providers subject to Chapter 108D of the General Statutes.”

What????

If House Bill 320 passes, what, may I ask, will be a Medicaid provider’s appeal options if NCGS 108C does not apply to MCOs? And would not the new scope of NCGS 108C-1 violate the State Plan, which explicitly gives OAH the jurisdiction over any contracted entity of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)?  See my blogs on MCOs: “NC MCOs: The Judge, Jury and Executioner,” and “A Dose of Truth: If an MCO Decides Not to Contract With You, YOU DO HAVE RIGHTS!”

I also wonder, if House Bill 320 passes, what effect this revision to NCGS 108C-1 will have. Arguably, it could have no effect because of the above-mentioned language in the State Plan, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals case that determined that MCOs are agents of the state, and the fact that the Department is defined in 108C-2 to include any of its legally authorized agents, contractors, or vendors.

On the other hand, in every single lawsuit that I would bring on behalf of a provider against an MCO, I would have another legal obstacle to overcome. The MCO’s attorney would invariably make the argument that OAH does not have jurisdiction over the MCO because the scope of 108C has been changed to exclude the MCOs. They have been arguing already that OAH lacks jurisdiction over the MCOs since NCGS 108D was passed, but to no avail.

Needless to say, the MCO lobbyists will be pushing hard for H 320 to pass. H 320 passed its 3rd reading on May 15, 2013, by a vote of 114-0, and the Senate received it on May 16, 2013.

Posted in 1915 b/c Waiver, Administrative Law Judge, Administrative Remedies, Appeal Rights, Behavioral health, Budget, Division of Medical Assistance, Health Care Providers and Services, Jurisdiction, KC v. Shipman, Lawsuit, Legal Analysis, Legal Remedies for Medicaid Providers, Legislation, Managed Care, MCO, Medicaid, Medicaid Appeals, Medicaid Budget, Medicaid Providers, Medicaid Recipient Appeals, Medicaid Recipients, Medicaid Services, N.C. Gen. Stat. 150B, NC, NC DHHS, NCGS 108C, NCGS 108D, North Carolina, OAH, Petitions for Contested Cases, Reconsideration Reviews

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How EPSDT Allows Medicaid Recipients Under the Age of 21 To Receive More Services Than Covered By NC State Plan

Apr 2

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EPSDT. What in the heck is EPSDT?

EPSDT is an acronym for the “Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT).” It only applies to Medicaid beneficiaries under the age of 21. As in, if you are 21, EPSDT does not apply to you. The point of EPSDT is to allow beneficiaries under the age of 21 to receive medically necessary services not normally allowed by the NC Medicaid State Plan. (These beneficiaries under the age of 21 I will call “children” for the sake of this blog, despite 18+ being a legal adult).

The definition of each part of the acronym is below:

Early:……. Assessing and identifying problems early
Periodic:…… Checking children’s health at periodic, age-appropriate intervals
Screening:…. Providing physical, mental, developmental, dental, hearing, vision, and other screening tests to detect potential problems
Diagnostic:…. Performing diagnostic tests to follow-up when a risk is identified, and
Treatment:…. Control, correct or reduce health problems found.

Federal Medicaid law at 42 U.S.C.§ 1396d(r) [1905(r) of the Social Security Act] requires state Medicaid programs to provide EPSDT for beneficiaries under 21 years of age. Within the scope of EPSDT benefits under the federal Medicaid law, states are required to cover any service that is medically necessary “to correct or ameliorate a defect, physical or mental illness, or a condition identified by screening,” whether or not the service is covered under the North Carolina State Medicaid Plan.

The services covered under EPSDT are limited to those within the scope of the category of services listed in the federal law at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a) [1905(a) of the Social Security Act].

For example, EPSDT will not cover, nor is it required to cover, purely cosmetic or experimental treatments.

Again, EPSDT allows for exceptions to Medicaid policies for beneficiaries under the age of 21. For example, if the DMA clinical policy for dental procedures does not cover a certain procedure, if the dentist determines that the procedure is medically necessary for a beneficiary under the age of 21, then the dentist can request prior approval under EPSDT simply by filling out a “non-covered services form” along with the other supporting documentation to establish medical necessity. More likely than not, the “non-covered procedure” would be approved.

Medical necessity is an interesting term. Medical necessity is not defined by statute. The American Medical Association (AMA) defines medical necessity as:

“Health care services or products that a prudent physician would provide to a patient for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, treating or rehabilitating an illness, injury, disease or its associated symptoms, impairments or functional limitations in a manner that is: (1) in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (2) clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site and duration; and (3) not primarily for the convenience of the patient, physician, or other health care provider.”

But, legally, the courts have construed medical necessity broadly when it comes to EPSDT. As in, generally speaking, if a doctor will testify that a procedure or service is medically necessary, then, generally speaking, a judge will accept the medical necessity of the procedure or service.

It seems as though I am degrading the intelligence of the judges that take the face value testimony of the doctors. But I am not.

Judges, like I, are not doctors. We do not have the benefit of a medical education. I say benefit because any education is a benefit, in my opinion.

It would be difficult for anyone who is not a doctor to disagree with the testimony of a physician testifying to medical necessity. I mean, unless the person stayed in a Holiday Inn Express the night before. (I know…bad joke).

Some courts, however, have ruled that the decision as to whether a procedure is medically necessary must be a joint effort by the state and the treating physician. Obviously, for courts that follow the “joint decision for medical necessity” holdings, less procedures would be allowed under EPSDT because, more likely than not, the state will disagree with a treating physician (I say this only from my own experience representing the state when the state disagreed with EPSDT treatments despite the treating physician testifying that the procedure was medically necessary).

For example, the 11th Circuit has held that both the state and the treating physician have a role in determining whether a procedure or treatment is medically necessary to correct or ameliorate a medical condition. The 11th circuit disagreed with the Northern District of Georgia’s determination that the state MUST provide the amount of services which the treating physician dreamed necessary. Moore v. Medows, No. 08-13926, 2009 WL 1099133 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2009).

Regardless, in practice, EPSDT is interpreted broadly. A long, long time ago, I worked at the Attorneys’ Generals office. A mother requested hyperbaric oxygen therapy (HBOT) for her autistic children (and I had to oppose her request because that was my job).

For those of you who do not know what HBOT is (I sure didn’t know what HBOT is prior to this particular case)…

“Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy (HBOT) is the use of high pressure oxygen as a drug to treat basic pathophysiologic processes and their diseases. HBOT has acute and chronic drug effects. Acutely, HBOT has been proven to be the most powerful inhibitor of reperfusion injury, which is the injury that occurs to tissue deprived of blood supply when blood flow is resumed. This is thought to be one of the primary mechanisms of hyperbaric oxygen therapy effects in acute global ischemia, anoxia, and coma. Chronically, HBOT acts as a signal inducer of DNA to effect trophic (growth) tissue changes.” See http://www.hbot.com/hbot.

I went and saw a hyperbaric oxygen treatment chamber in preparation of my case. It’s pretty intimidating. It is a large chamber made of thick metal. It looks like you could get inside, have it submerged under the ocean, and explore. It appears similar to a submarine. And, interestingly, it is most often used for divers who get the bends.

It is highly controversial as to whether HBOT cures, remedies or ameliorates autistic symptoms. I had two experts testifying that HBOT was experimental, and, therefore, not covered by Medicaid, even with EPSDT. (Remember, back then I was at the AG’s office).

Yet, despite the fact that HBOT was still controversial as to whether it ameliorates the symptoms of autism, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) used the EPSDT doctrine to rule that the mother’s children could receive HBOT and Medicaid must pay for the services.

That is the power of EPSDT. HBOT was clearly not covered by Medicaid for the purpose of ameliorating symptoms of autism. But, for the children named in the Petition who were under 21, Medicaid paid nonetheless.

HBOT allows beneficiaries under the age of 21 to receive medically necessary services that would not normally be allowed under the North Carolina Medicaid State Plan.

Importantly, EPSDT provides for private rights of action under 1983. At least all the federal circuit court of appeals have held such.

Oh, and, BTW, NCTracks will soon also be in charge of EPSDT determinations.

Posted in Administrative Law Judge, Clinical Policy 4A, CMS, Denials of Medicaid Services, Dental Medicaid Providers, Division of Medical Assistance, DMA Clinical Policies, EPSDT, Federal Law, Health Care Providers and Services, Lawsuit, Legal Analysis, Medicaid, Medicaid Appeals, Medicaid Recipient Appeals, Medicaid Recipients, Medicaid Recipients Under 21, Medical Necessity, NC, NC DHHS, NCTrack Glitches, NCTracks, North Carolina, Prior Authorization, State Plan

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Attention: All Medicaid Providers Whose Services Require Prior Authorization: A Way to Increase Revenue and Help Medicaid Recipients…Or…Killing Two Birds with One Stone

Oct 11

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Attention: All Medicaid Providers Whose Services Require Prior Authorization

A Way to Increase Revenue and Help Medicaid Recipients

Have you heard the cliché: “Killing two birds with one stone….?”

The phrase is thought to have originated in the early 1600s when slingshots were primarily used for bird hunting.  (BTW: My husband, who is an expert bird hunter (with guns), I am sure, would be able to hit two birds with one stone…he is that good.  In fact, he may have already shot two birds with one bullet).  Anyway, Thomas Hobbs, an English political philosopher, is generally given credit for coining the phrase in 1656, although Ovid has a similar expression in Latin over 2000 years prior.  Killing two birds with one stone generally means achieving two objectives with one action. (Which, obviously, is a good thing).

For our purposes here, killing two birds with one stone means that by undergoing one action (appealing all Medicaid recipients’ denials, terminations, and reductions for services requiring prior authorization) two positive results are achieved:

1. The Medicaid recipients have their denials, terminations, and reductions appealed (or…people who need services may actually get those necessary services); and

2. Your provider company makes more money.

Not all Medicaid services require prior authorization.  But many do.  Many prescription drugs require prior approval.  Certain services during a pregnancy for a Medicaid pregnant woman require prior authorization. In behavioral health care, almost all services require prior authorizations (although there are some unmanaged visits in outpatient behavioral health (OBT) that do not require prior authorization).  Even though other Medicaid services require prior authorization, this blog and NCGS 108D only applies to behavioral health care (because NCGS 108D applies to MCOs and the MCOs only manage behavioral health care).  You should appeal all other denied, terminated, or reduced Medicaid services that require prior authorization, but the appeal process in this blog pertains to behavioral health care.

Why care about Medicaid recipient appeals?

It is indisputable that people start companies to make money (except 501(c) companies).  You’ve heard all the cliches…”Money makes the world go around…” “The lack of money is the root of all evil…” “Money: power at its most liquid…”

We’ve also heard all the cliches…”Money can’t buy happiness…” “I have no money, no resources, no hope. I am the happiest man alive….” “Money has never made man happy, nor will it, there is nothing in its nature to produce happiness. The more of it one has the more one wants.”

Regardless whether you believe that money is a necessary evil or the key to happiness, it is without question that people need money to get by in life.  Therefore, when people create companies, it is, normally, with the intent to make money.

Medicaid providers are no exception.

True, Medicaid reimbursements are crappy.  But, despite the crappy/low Medicaid reimbursements, Medicaid providers still hope to make some profit…and do good. (2 birds…1 stone).

We all want to make money and help Medicaid recipients, right? (I know I do).

So with my “handy dandy” tips in this blog, you, too, can kill two birds with stone. You can do both: make more money and help Medicaid recipients.

Wait, I thought providers could not appeal on behalf of our clients? I have heard this incorrect statement over and over from multiple clients.  It simply is not true.

NCGS 108D(4)(b) states that “[e]nrollees, or network providers authorized in writing to act on behalf of enrollees, may file requests for grievances and LME/MCO level appeals orally or in writing. However, unless the enrollee or network provider requests an expedited appeal, the oral filing must be followed by a written, signed grievance or appeal.” (emphasis added).

You just need the Medicaid recipient’s consent in writing.

Increased Profit AND Providing Medicaid Services to Recipients: Two Birds…One Stone!

First, how would appealing all terminations, denials and reductions for Medicaid services increase profit for you, as a provider?

For terminations and reductions (not initial authorizations), if you appeal, the Medicaid recipients are required to receive maintenance of service (MOS).  This means that, at the very least (even if you lose), if you appeal, you are able to provide services and be reimbursed for services during the appeal process. 

For example, you have a developmentally disabled (DD) Medicaid client, who has received 8 hours/day personal care services (PCS) for the last 4 years.  You submit your yearly plan of care (POC) requesting 8 hours PCS/day per norm.  The managed care organization (MCO) reduces your client’s PCS to 6 hours/day.  If you timely appeal the reduction or termination, the MCO will be required to reimburse for 8 hours PCS/day throughout the appeal process.

NCGS 108D-6(c) states: “Continuation of Benefits. – An LME/MCO shall continue the enrollee’s benefits during the pendency of a LME/MCO level appeal to the same extent required under 42 C.F.R. § 438.420.”

42 C.F.R. 438.420 states that:

“Continuation of benefits. The MCO or PIHP must continue the enrollee’s benefits if—

(1) The enrollee or the provider files the appeal timely;
(2) The appeal involves the termination, suspension, or reduction of a previously authorized course of treatment;
(3) The services were ordered by an authorized provider;
(4) The original period covered by the original authorization has not expired; and
(5) The enrollee requests extension of benefits.

Pay particular attention to subsection (5)…the enrollee must request MOS.  Don’t forget to add that little phrase into the form that you have the enrollee sign to consent to appeal.

MOS allows you to be paid during the appeal AND the Medicaid recipient to receive the medically necessary services during the pendency of the appeal.

Two birds…one stone.

For terminations and reductions, there is no need to ask for an expedited hearing (will discuss momentarily), because with MOS, there is no hurry (the recipient is receiving the needed services and you are getting paid).

So, let’s turn to an initial denial for a Medicaid service that requires prior authorization and the appeal process:

If the MCO denies an initial authorization, the Medicaid recipient is not entitled to MOS.  However, appealing these initial denials are just as important to (a) the recipients; and (b) your profit as appealing the terminations and denials.

But an appeal can takes months and the recipient (assuming medical necessity truly exists) needs the behavioral health care services in order to not decompensate. So how can the appeal help?

Answer: Request an expedited appeal.

NCGS 108D-7 states:

“When the time limits for completing a standard appeal could seriously jeopardize the enrollee’s life or health or ability to attain, maintain, or regain maximum function, an enrollee, or a network provider authorized in writing to act on behalf of an enrollee, has the right to file a request for an expedited appeal of a managed care action no later than 30 days after the mailing date of the notice of managed care action. For expedited appeal requests made by enrollees, the LME/MCO shall determine if the enrollee qualifies for an expedited appeal. For expedited appeal requests made by network providers on behalf of enrollees, the LME/MCO shall presume an expedited appeal is necessary.”

Important: You still have 30 days to appeal.

Even more important: The MCO is required, by statute, to PRESUME an expedited appeal is necessary.

True the General Assembly really gave mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and substance abuse population the shaft when they passed, and McCrory signed, Senate Bill 553, now Session Law 2013-397, by placing the legal burden of proof on the Medicaid recipient in all circumstances (really??), but the small ray of hope is that, at least as it pertains to expedited appeals, the MCO must presume that an expedited appeal is necessary for the well-being of the recipient.

Going back to expedited appeals, the MCO must make “reasonable efforts” (yes, there is too much wiggle room there) to notify the Medicaid recipient/provider of a denial of an expedited appeal within 2 days.  I also believe that is in the best interest of an MCO to authorize expedited appeals, because….could you imagine the implications and legal liability on the MCO if the MCO denies an appeal to be expedited and something horrible happens to the Medicaid recipient as a direct result of the MCO’s refusal to expedite the appeal????  Or, even worse, the recipient harms others as a  result of the appeal not being expedited??? WHOOO HOOOO….talk about bad PR!!!

So, two days to determine whether the MCO will accept the request for an expedited appeal.  How long for a decision?

According to NCGS 108D-7(d), “[i]f the LME/MCO grants a request for an expedited LME/MCO level appeal, the LME/MCO shall resolve the appeal as expeditiously as the enrollee’s health condition requires, and no later than three working days after receiving the request for an expedited appeal. The LME/MCO shall provide the enrollee and all other affected parties with a written notice of resolution by United States mail within this three-day period.”  (emphasis added).

So, basically, if the MCO takes 2 days to decide to accept the expedited appeal, then there is only 1 additional day to determine the results of the appeal.  That is fast…I don’t care who you are!!

If the MCO denies the expedited appeal, then the MCO has 45 days to provide a decision.

Very Important:  Any adverse decision from an MCO is appealable to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Ok, recap:  You, as a provider, want to appeal all Medicaid recipient denials, terminations, and reductions for the following two reasons:

1. Increase profitability for your company; and

2. Help the Medicaid recipients by appealing denials, terminations or reductions, and, hopefully, obtaining the medically necessary services for your clients.

Win…win.

2 birds…1 stone.

Posted in Administrative Law Judge, Administrative Remedies, Appeal Deadlines, Behavioral health, Burden of Proof, Denials of Claims, Denials of Medicaid Services, Division of Medical Assistance, Expedited Appeal, Health Care Providers and Services, Lawsuit, Legal Analysis, Legal Remedies for Medicaid Providers, Legislation, Maintenance of Service, MCO, Medicaid, Medicaid Appeals, Medicaid Recipient Appeals, Medicaid Recipients, Medicaid Reimbursements, Medicaid Services, Medical Necessity, Mental Health, Mental Health Problems, Mental Illness, NC, NC DHHS, NCGS 108D, North Carolina, OAH, Office of Administrative Hearings, Plan of Care, Prior Authorization, Reconsideration Reviews

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