Category Archives: Medicaid Recipient Appeals
A sneaky and under-publicized matter, which will affect every one of you reading this, slid into common law last year with a very recent case, dated Jan. 9, 2020, upholding and expanding the findings of a 2018 case, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (U.S. 2018). In Lucia, the Supreme Court upheld the plain language of the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause.
The Appointments Clause prescribes the exclusive means of appointing “officers.” Only the President, a court of law, or a head of department can do so. See Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
In Lucia, the sole issue was whether an administrative law judge (ALJ) can be appointed by someone other than the President or a department head under Article II, §2, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution, or whether ALJs simply federal employees. The Lucia court held that ALJs must be appointed by the President or the department head; this is a non-delegable duty. The most recent case, Sara White Dove-Ridgeway v. Nancy Berrryhill, 2020 WL 109034, (D.Ct.DE, Jan. 9, 2020), upheld and expanded Lucia.
ALJs are appointed. In many states, ALJs are direct employees of a single state agency. In other words, in many states, about half, the payroll check that an ALJ receives bears the emblem of the department of health for that state. I have litigated in administrative courts in approximately 33 states, and have seen my share of surprises. In one case, many years ago, LinkedIn informed me that my appointed ALJ was actually a professional photographer by trade.
Lucia, however, determined that ALJs at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were “officers of the United States,” subject to the Appointment Clause of the Constitution, which requires officers to be appointed by the president, the heads of departments, or the courts. The court’s decision raised concern at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) because its ALJs had not been appointed by the secretary, but rather by lower agency officials.
The court also held that relief should be granted to “one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case.” Whether that relief is monetary, in the form of attorneys’ fees reimbursed or out-of-pocket costs, it is unclear.
In July 2018, President Trump’s Executive Order 13843 excepted ALJs from the competitive service, so agency heads, like HHS Secretary Alex Azar, could directly select the best candidates through a process that would ensure the merit-based appointment of individuals with the specific experience and expertise needed by the selecting agencies.
The executive order also accepted all previously appointed ALJs. So there became a pre-July 16, 2018, challenge and a post-July 16, 2018, based on Trump’s Executive Order. Post-July 16, 2018, appointees had to be appointed by the President or department head. But the argument could be made that ALJs appointed pre-July 16, 2018, were grandfathered into the more lax standards. In Dove-Ridgway, Social Security benefits were at issue. On July 5, 2017, ALJ Jack S. Pena found a plaintiff not disabled. On Jan. 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed an appeal of the ALJ’s decision, seeking judicial review from the district court. In what seems to be the fastest decision ever to emerge from a court of law, two days later, a ruling was rendered. The District Court found that even though at the time of the administrative decision, Lucia and Trump’s Executive Order had not been issued, the court still held that the ALJ needed to have been appointed constitutionally. It ordered a remand for a rehearing before a different, constitutionally appointed ALJ, despite the fact that Trump had accepted all previously appointed ALJs.
In this firsthand, post-Jan. 9, 2020, era, we have an additional defense against Medicare or Medicaid audits or alleged overpayments in our arsenal: was the ALJ appointed properly, per the U.S. Constitution?
Programming Note: Listen to Knicole Emanuel’s live reports on Monitor Monday, 10-10:30 a.m. EST.
As seen on RACMonitor.
It’s that time of year again. The legislators are back in town. Moral Mondays resume. And all eyes are on the General Assembly. But, this is the short session, and the General Statutes limit the powers of legislative law-making in the short session.
For those of you who do not know how our General Assembly (GA) works and the difference between the short and long sessions, let me explain:
In odd-numbered years, the GA meets in January and continues until it adjourns. There is no requirement as to the length of the long session, but it is normally about 6 months. In the long session, everything is fair game. New laws or changes to the existing laws can be proposed in long sessions for all of the subjects on which the GA legislates.
The short session reconvenes every even-numbered year and typically lasts 6 weeks. Last year the long session adjourned July 26, 2013, and the GA reconvened May 14, 2014.
There are limits as to what measures may be considered in the short session. In fact, at the end of the long session, the GA passed Resolution 2013-23, which states exactly what topics/bills may be considered in the short session.
So…the question is: What Medicaid bills may be considered during this short session?
Now there are of course, exceptions. For example, any bill that directly and primarily affects the State Budget can be introduced. Obviously, a Medicaid bill could, arguably, directly and primarily affect the budget.
The bills I enumerated above, however, are the bills that are allowed to be considered in the short session because they constitute a crossover bill, that is, these bills were passed one house and were received in the other during last year’s long session and are considered “still alive” for consideration during the current short session.
So what do these Medicaid bills propose?
House Bill 674 could be a game changer for Medicaid providers. The bill, which passed the House last year with a vote of 116-0, would direct the Program Evaluation Division to study the contested case process in regards to Medicaid providers. There are 3 key components in this study according to the bill:
1. The Division must review the procedures for a contested case hearing under NCGS 150B and determine whether there is a way to streamline the process and decrease backlog.
2. The Division must consider alternative methods of review other than the contested cases.
3. The Division must review NCGS 108C-12 to determine whether any amendments to the law would improve the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the Medicaid appeal process. (NCGS 108C-12 is the statute that allows providers to appeal adverse decisions to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)).
Whew. The Program Evaluation Division would have its work cut out for it if the bill passes!
House Bill 674 was received by the Senate on May 5, 2013, and it passed its first reading.
House Bill 867 is named “An Act to Allow for the Movement of Certain Medicaid Recipients,” and it purports to allow those recipients with an 1915(c) Innovations Waiver slot to move about the State and for the slots to be recognized uniformly across the State. This way a person with an Innovations Waiver would not need to re-apply in another county if he or she moves there. However, for those served by the managed care organizations (MCOs), residency is determined by the county in which the recipient currently resides.
Then we come to House Bill 320. See my blog,”HB320: The Good News and the Bad News for NC Medicaid Providers.”
House Bill 320 mainly speaks to Medicaid recipient appeals, but imbedded within the language is one tiny proposed change to NCGS 108C-1. Just an itty, bitty change.
NCGS 108C-1 provides the scope of 108C (which applies to providers) and currently reads, “This Chapter applies to providers enrolled in Medicaid or Health Choice.”
If House Bill 320 passes, NCGS 108C-1 will read, “This Chapter applies to providers enrolled in Medicaid or Health Choice. Except as expressly provided by law, this Chapter does not apply to LME/MCOs, enrollees, applicants, providers of emergency services, or network providers subject to Chapter 108D of the General Statutes.”
If House Bill 320 passes, what, may I ask, will be a Medicaid provider’s appeal options if NCGS 108C does not apply to MCOs? And would not the new scope of NCGS 108C-1 violate the State Plan, which explicitly gives OAH the jurisdiction over any contracted entity of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)? See my blogs on MCOs: “NC MCOs: The Judge, Jury and Executioner,” and “A Dose of Truth: If an MCO Decides Not to Contract With You, YOU DO HAVE RIGHTS!”
I also wonder, if House Bill 320 passes, what effect this revision to NCGS 108C-1 will have. Arguably, it could have no effect because of the above-mentioned language in the State Plan, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals case that determined that MCOs are agents of the state, and the fact that the Department is defined in 108C-2 to include any of its legally authorized agents, contractors, or vendors.
On the other hand, in every single lawsuit that I would bring on behalf of a provider against an MCO, I would have another legal obstacle to overcome. The MCO’s attorney would invariably make the argument that OAH does not have jurisdiction over the MCO because the scope of 108C has been changed to exclude the MCOs. They have been arguing already that OAH lacks jurisdiction over the MCOs since NCGS 108D was passed, but to no avail.
Needless to say, the MCO lobbyists will be pushing hard for H 320 to pass. H 320 passed its 3rd reading on May 15, 2013, by a vote of 114-0, and the Senate received it on May 16, 2013.