Category Archives: Primary Care
99214. Is that Jean Valjean’s number? No. It is an E/M code of moderate complexity. Few CPT codes cause goosebumps, chilly air, and a pit in your stomach besides 99214. As I said, 99214 is an E/M code of moderate level of complexity. For a low complexity visit, the code decreases to 99213. Even lower is a 99212, which is considered a straightforward visit. The code goes as high as a 99215, which denotes high complexity. Generally, physicians are good at spotting the 99215s and 99212s; the lowest and highest complexities seem simple to spot. However, the middle complexity codes are a bit subjective. Auditors frequently find 99214s that the auditor thinks should have been a 99213. I am talking about the RACs, MACs, TPEs, UPICs, and other contractors paid with our tax dollars on behalf of CMS. I recently had a BCBS audit, which found that an urgent care center had a 97% error rate. Out of 30 claims, only one claim was considered 99214; 29 claims should have been down coded to a 99213, according to BCBS. Well, my urgent care center disagreed and hired an independent auditor to review the same claims that were audited. The independent audit resulted in vastly different results. According to the independent audit, only 4 of the 30 claims should have been down coded to 99213.
One should ask, how could two separate auditors audit the same documents and issue such disparate results? One reason is that the difference between 99213 and 99214 is subjective. However, subjectiveness was not the only reason for two polar opposite results.
You see, before 2021, facilities had the choice to follow either the 1995 guidelines or the 1997 guidelines for these CPT codes. And, there is a difference between the two guidelines. Instead of choosing either the 1995 or 1997 guidelines, BCBS applied both the 1997 and 1995 guidelines, which falsely created a more stringent criteria for a 99214.
The urgent care center had been verbose about the fact that they use the 1995 guidelines, not the 1997 guidelines. When the independent contractor audited the records, it used the 1995 guidelines only.
All in all, for an accusation of owing $180k, it cost the urgent care center almost $100k to defend itself against what was obviously a faulty audit. So, I’m thinking why in the world is there insurance for physicians for making a mistake in surgery – medical malpractice, but no insurance for False Claims allegations. I mean, med mal allegations mean there is a victim. But you can be accused of false claims unexpectantly and your practice is changed forever.
Recently, I learned of an insurance company that insures doctors and facilities if they are accused of billing Medicare or Medicaid for false claims. Unlike med mal, an accusation of false claims does not yield a victim (unless you see our tax dollars as people); however, an accusation of billing a False Claim can cost a doctor, facility, a hospital hundreds of thousands of dollars. Which, knowing all things are relative, is pennies on the dollar of the penalties under the FCA.
The company’s name is Curi. That is C-U-R-I. Personally, I had never heard of this company. I googled it after I was placed on the panel. This is an insurance company that pays for attorneys’ fees if you are accused of false claims or an overpayment. Personally, I think every listener should procure this insurance directly after RACMonitor. After 23 years of litigating, I have realized the worst part about defending yourself against accusations that you owe the government money is the huge price tag associated with it.
When I presented this story on RACMonitor, David Glaser made a comment about my segment that I would be remiss to omit. SOME med mal insurance policies cover the legal fees for attorneys for regulatory audits. Please review your policy to see whether your insurance company covers the attorneys’ fees for defense of regulatory audits before purchasing more insurance.
Right now, CMS allows physicians to pick to follow the 1995 or 1997 guidelines for determining whether an evaluation and management (“e/m”) visit qualifies for a 99214 versus a 99213. The biggest difference between the two policies is that the 1995 guideline allows you to check by systems, rather than individual organs. Starting January 1, 2023, there are a lot of revisions, including a 2021 guidance that will be used. But, for dates of service before 2021, physicians can pick between 1995 and 1997 guidance.
Why is this an issue?
If you are a family practitioner and get audited by Medicare, Medicaid, or private pay, you better be sure that your auditor audits with the right policy.
According to CPT, 99214 is indicated for an “office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least two of these three key components: a detailed history, a detailed examination and medical decision making of moderate complexity.”
Think 99214 in any of the following situations:
- If the patient has a new complaint with a potential for significant morbidity if untreated or misdiagnosed,
- If the patient has three or more old problems,
- If the patient has a new problem that requires a prescription,
- If the patient has three stable problems that require medication refills, or one stable problem and one inadequately controlled problem that requires medication refills or adjustments.
The above is simplified and shorthand, so read the 1995 and 1997 guidance carefully.
An insurance company audited a client of mine and clearly used the 1997 guidance. On the audit report, the 1997 guidance was checked as being used. In fact, according to the audit report, the auditors used BOTH the 1997 and 1995 guidance, which, logically, would make a harder, more stringent standard for a 99214 than using one policy.
Now the insurance company claims my client owes money. However, if the insurance company merely applied the 1995 guidance only, then, we believe, that he wouldn’t owe a dime. Now he has to hire me, defend himself to the insurance company, and possibly litigate if the insurance company stands its ground.
Sadly, the above story is not an anomaly. I see auditors misapply policies by using the wrong years all the time, almost daily. Always appeal. Never roll over.
Sometimes it is a smart decision to hire an independent expert to verify that the physician is right, and the auditors are wrong. If the audit is extrapolated, then it is wise to hire an expert statistician. See blog. And blog. The extrapolation rules were recently revised…well, in the last two or three years, so be sure you know the rules, as well. See blog.
Is this the end of the managed care organizations (MCOs)?
If the Senate’s proposed committee substitute (PCS) to House Bill 403 (HB 403) passes the answer is yes. The Senate’s PCS to House Bill 403 was just favorably reported out of the Senate Health Care Committee on June 15, 2017. The next step for the bill to advance will be approval by the Senate Rules Committee. Click here to watch its progress.
As my readers are well aware, I am not a proponent for the MCOs. I think the MCOs are run by overpaid executives, who pay themselves too high of bonuses, hire charter flights, throw fancy holiday parties, and send themselves and their families on expensive retreats – to the detriment of Medicaid recipients’ services and Medicaid providers’ reimbursement rates. See blog. And blog.
Over the last couple days, my email has been inundated by people abhorred with HB 403 – urging the Senators to retain the original HB 403, instead of the PCS version. As with all legislation, there are good and bad components. I went back and re-read these emails, and I realized multiple authors sat on an MCO Board. Of course MCO Board members will be against HB 403! Instead of hopping up and down “for” or “against” HB 403, I propose a (somewhat) objective review of the proposed legislation in this blog.
While I do not agree with everything found in HB 403, I certainly believe it is a step in the right direction. The MCOs have not been successful. Medically necessary behavioral health care services have been reduced or terminated, quality health care providers have been terminated from catchment areas, and our tax dollars have been misused.
However, I do have concern about how quickly the MCOs would be dissolved and the new PHPs would be put into effect. There is no real transition period, which could provide safety nets to ensure continuity of services. We all remember when NCTracks was implemented in 2013 and MMIS was removed on the same day. There was no overlap – and the results were catastrophic.
The following bullet points are the main issues found in HB 403, as currently written.
- Effective date – MCOs dissolve immediately (This could be dangerous if not done properly)
Past legislation enacted a transition time to dissolve the MCOs. Session Law 2015-245, as amended by Session Law 2016-121, provided that the MCOs would be dissolved in four years, allowing the State to implement a new system slowly instead of yanking the tablecloth from the table with hopes of the plates, glasses, and silverware not tumbling to the ground.
According to HB 403, “on the date when Medicaid capitated contracts with Prepaid Health Plans (PHPs) begin, as required by S.L. 2015-245, all of the following shall occur:…(2) The LME/MCOs shall be dissolved.”
Session Law 2015-245 states the following timeline: “LME/MCOs shall continue to manage the behavioral health services currently covered for their enrollees under all existing waivers, including the 1915(b) and (c) waivers, for four years after the date capitated PHP contracts begin. During this four-year period, the Division of Health Benefits shall continue to negotiate actuarially sound capitation rates directly
with the LME/MCOs in the same manner as currently utilized.”
HB 403 revises Session Law 2015-245’s timeline by the following: “
LME/MCOs shall continue to manage the behavioral health services currently covered for their enrollees under all existing waivers, including the 1915(b) and (c) waivers, for four years after the date capitated PHP contracts begin. During this four-year period, the Division of Health Benefits shall continue to negotiate actuarially sound capitation rates directly with the LME/MCOs in the same manner as currently utilized.”
Instead of a 4-year transition period, the day the PHP contracts are effective, the MCOs no longer exist. Poof!! Maybe Edward Bulwer-Lytton was right when he stated, “The pen is mightier than the sword.”
Again, I am not opposed to dissolving the MCOs for behavioral health care; I just want whatever transition to be reasonable and safe for Medicaid recipients and providers.
With the MCOs erased from existence, what system will be put in place? According to HB 403, PHPs shall manage all behavioral health care now managed by MCOs and all the remaining assets (i.e., all those millions sitting in the savings accounts of the MCOs) will be transferred to DHHS in order to fund the contracts with the PHPs and any liabilities of the MCOs. (And what prevents or does not prevent an MCO simply saying, “Well, now we will act as a PHP?”).
What is a PHP? HB 403 defines PHPs as an entity, which may be a commercial plan or provider-led entity with a PHP license from the Department of Insurance and will operate a capitated contract for the delivery of services. “Services covered by PHP:
- Physical health services
- Prescription drugs
- Long-term care services
- Behavioral health services
The capitated contracts shall not cover:
Behavioral health Dentist services
- The fabrication of eyeglasses…”
It would appear that dentists will also be managed by PHPs. As currently written, HB 403 also sets no less than three and no more than five contracts between DHHS and the PHPs should be implemented.
Don’t we need a Waiver from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)?
Yes. We need a Waiver. 42 CFR 410.10(e) states that “[t]he Medicaid agency may not delegate, to other than its own officials, the authority to supervise the plan or to develop or issue policies, rules, and regulations on program matters.” In order to “Waive” this clause, we must get permission from CMS. We had to get permission from CMS when we created the MCO model. The same is true for a new PHP model.
Technically, HB 403 is mandating DHHS to implement a PHP model before we have permission from the federal government. HB 403 does instruct DHHS to submit a demonstration waiver application. Still, there is always concern and hesitancy surrounding implementation of a Medicaid program without the blessing of CMS.
- The provider network (This is awesome)
HB 403 requires that all contracts between PHPs and DHHS have a clause that requires PHPs to not exclude providers from their networks except for failure to meet objective quality standards or refusal to accept network rates.
- PHPs use of money (Also good)
Clearly, the General Assembly drafted HB 403 out of anger toward the MCOs. HB 403 implements more supervision over the new entities. It also disallows use of money on alcohol, first-class airfare, charter flights, holiday parties or similar social gatherings, and retreats, which, we all know these are precisely the activities that State Auditor Beth Wood found occurring, at least, at Cardinal. See Audit Report.
HB 403 also mandates that the Office of State Human Resources revise and update the job descriptions for the area directors and set limitations on salaries. No more “$1.2 million in CEO salaries paid without proper authorization.”
- Provider contracts with the PHPs (No choice is never good)
It appears that HB 403 will not allow providers to choose which PHP to join. DHHS is to create the regions for the PHPs and every county must be assigned to a PHP. Depending on how these PHPs are created, we could be looking at a similar situation that we have now with the MCOs. If the State is going to force you to contract with a PHP to provide Medicaid services, I would want the ability to choose the PHP.
In conclusion, HB 403 will re-shape our entire Medicaid program, if passed. It will abolish the MCO system, apply to almost all Medicaid services (both physical and mental), open the provider network, limit spending on inappropriate items, and assign counties to a PHP.
Boy, what I would give to be a fly on the wall in all the MCO’s boardrooms (during the closed sessions).
Under the Trump Administration, some Republican governors may look to move their Medicaid programs in a more conservative direction. In his latest column for Axios, Drew Altman discusses the arguments about Medicaid “work requirements” and why few people are likely to be affected by them in practice.
I posted/wrote the below blog in 2017. I re-read my February 10, 2017, blog, which was entitled “NC DHHS’ New Secretary – Yay or Nay?” with the new perspective of COVID-19 being such a hot potato topic and sparking so much controversy. Interestingly, at least to me, I still stand by what I wrote. You have to remember that viruses are not political. Viruses spread despite your bank account, age, or location. Sure, variables matter. For example, I am statistically safer from COVID because I live on a small, horse farm in North Carolina rather than an apartment in Manhattan.
The facts are the facts. Viruses and facts are not political.
I was surprised that more people did not react to my February 10, 2017, blog, which is re-posted below – exactly as it was first posted. For some reason (COVID-19), people are re-reading it.
Our newly appointed DHHS Secretary comes with a fancy and distinguished curriculum vitae. Dr. Mandy Cohen, DHHS’ newly appointed Secretary by Gov. Roy Cooper, is trained as an internal medicine physician. She is 38 (younger than I am) and has no known ties to North Carolina. She grew up in New York; her mother was a nurse practitioner. She is also a sharp contrast from our former, appointed, DHHS Secretary Aldona Wos. See blog.
Prior to the appointment as our DHHS Secretary, Dr. Cohen was the Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief of Staff at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Prior to acting as the COO of CMS, she was Principal Deputy Director of the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) at CMS where she oversaw the Health Insurance Marketplace and private insurance market regulation. Prior to her work at CCIIO, she served as a Senior Advisor to the Administrator coordinating Affordable Care Act implementation activities.
Did she ever practice medicine?
Prior to acting as Senior Advisor to the Administrator, Dr. Cohen was the Director of Stakeholder Engagement for the CMS Innovation Center, where she investigated new payment and care delivery models.
Dr. Cohen received her Bachelor’s degree in policy analysis and management from Cornell University, 2000. She obtained her Master’s degree in health administration from Harvard University School of Public Health, 2004, and her Medical degree from Yale University School of Medicine, 2005.
She started as a resident physician at Massachusetts General Hospital from 2005 through 2008, then was deputy director for comprehensive women’s health services at the Department of Veterans Affairs from July 2008 through July 2009. From 2009 through 2011, she was executive director of the Doctors for America, a group that promoted the idea that any federal health reform proposal ought to include a government-run “public option” health insurance program for the uninsured.
Again, I was perplexed. Did she ever practice medicine? Does she even have a current medical license?
This is what I found:
It appears that Dr. Cohen was issued a medical license in 2007, but allowed it to expire in 2012 – most likely, because she was no longer providing medical services and was climbing the regulatory and political ladder.
From what I could find, Dr. Cohen practiced medicine (with a fully-certified license) from June 20, 2007, through July 2009 (assuming that she practiced medicine while acting as the deputy director for comprehensive women’s health services at the Department of Veterans Affairs).
Let me be crystal clear: It is not my contention that Dr. Cohen is not qualified to act as our Secretary to DHHS because she seemingly only practiced medicine (fully-licensed) for two years. Her political and policy experience is impressive. I am only saying that, to the extent that Dr. Cohen is being touted as a perfect fit for our new Secretary because of her medical experience, let’s not make much ado of her practicing medicine for two years.
That said, regardless Dr. Cohen’s practical medical experience, anyone who has been the COO of CMS must have intricate knowledge of Medicare and Medicaid and the essential understanding of the relationship between NC DHHS and the federal government. In this regard, Cooper hit a homerun with this appointment.
Herein lies the conundrum with Dr. Cohen’s appointment as DHHS Secretary:
Is there a conflict of interest?
During Cooper’s first week in office, our new Governor sought permission, unilaterally, from the federal government to expand Medicaid as outlined in the Affordable Care Act. This was on January 6, 2017.
To which agency does Gov. Cooper’s request to expand Medicaid go? Answer: CMS. Who was the COO of CMS on January 6, 2017? Answer: Cohen. When did Cohen resign from CMS? January 12, 2017.
On January 14, 2017, a federal judge stayed any action to expand Medicaid pending a determination of Cooper’s legal authority to do so. But Gov. Cooper had already announced his appointment of Dr. Cohen as Secretary of DHHS, who is and has been a strong proponent of the ACA. You can read one of Dr. Cohen’s statements on the ACA here.
In fact, regardless your political stance on Medicaid expansion, Gov. Cooper’s unilateral request to expand Medicaid without the General Assembly is a violation of NC S.L. 2013-5, which states:
SECTION 3. The State will not expand the State’s Medicaid eligibility under the Medicaid expansion provided in the Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148, as amended, for which the enforcement was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business, et al. v. Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). No department, agency, or institution of this State shall attempt to expand the Medicaid eligibility standards provided in S.L. 2011-145, as amended, or elsewhere in State law, unless directed to do so by the General Assembly.
Obviously, if Gov. Cooper’s tactic were to somehow circumvent S.L. 2013-5 and reach CMS before January 20, 2017, when the Trump administration took over, the federal judge blockaded that from happening with its stay on January 14, 2017.
But is it a bit sticky that Gov. Cooper appointed the COO of CMS, while she was still COO of CMS, to act as our Secretary of DHHS, and requested CMS for Medicaid expansion (in violation of NC law) while Cohen was acting COO?
You tell me.
I did find an uplifting quotation from Dr. Cohen from a 2009 interview with a National Journal reporter:
“There’s a lot of uncompensated work going on, so there has to be a component that goes beyond just fee-for service… But you don’t want a situation where doctors have to be the one to take on all the risk of taking care of a patient. Asking someone to take on financial risk in a small practice is very concerning.” -Dr. Mandy Cohen
Anti-Kickback statutes (AKS) and Stark law are extremely important issues in health care. Violations of these laws yield harsh penalties. Yet, many healthcare professionals have little to no knowledge on the details of these two legal beasts.
The most common question I get regarding AKS and Stark is: Do AKS and Stark apply to private payers? Health care professionals believe, if I don’t accept Medicare or Medicaid, then I don’t need to worry about AKS and Stark. Are they correct??
The general and overly broad response is that the Stark Law, 42 USC § 1395nn, only applies to Medicare and Medicaid. The AKS, 42 USC § 1320a-7b(b)),applies to any federal healthcare program.
Is there a difference between AKS and Stark?
Answer: Yes. As discussed above, the first difference is that AKS applies to all federal healthcare programs. This stark difference (pun intended) makes the simple decision to not accept Medicare and Medicaid, thus allowing you to never worry about AKS, infinitely more difficult.
Let’s take a step back… What are AKS and Stark laws and what do these laws prohibit? When you Google AKS and Stark, a bunch of legal blogs pop up and attempt to explain, in legalese, what two, extremely esoteric laws purport to say, using words like “renumeration,” “knowing and willful,” and “federal healthcare program.” You need a law license to decipher the deciphering of AKS and Stark. The truth is – it ain’t rocket science.
The AKS is a criminal law; if you violate the AKS, you can be prosecuted as a criminal. The criminal offense is getting something of value for referrals. You cannot refer patients to other health care professionals in exchange for money, reduced rent, use of laboratory equipment, referrals to you, health services for your mother, marketing, weekly meals at Ruth’s Chris, weekly meals at McDonalds, oil changes, discounted theater tickets, Uber rides, Costco coupons, cooking lessons, or…anything of value, regardless the value.
Safe harbors (exceptions to AKS) exist. But those exceptions better fit squarely into the definition of the exceptions. Because there are no exceptions beyond the enumerated exceptions.
AKS is much more broad in scope than Stark. Other than Medicare and Medicaid, AKS applies to any health care plan that utilizes any amount of federal funds. For example, AKS applies to Veterans Health Care, State Children’s Health Programs (CHIP), Federal Employees Health Benefit Program, and many other programs with federal funding. Even if you opt to not accept Medicare and Medicaid, you may still be liable under AKS.
Stark law, on the other hand, is more narrow and only applies to Medicare and Medicaid. I find the following “cheat sheet” created by a subdivision of the Office of Inspector General to be helpful in understanding AKS and Stark and the differences between the two:
One other important aspect of Stark is that is considered “strict liability,” whereas AKS requires a proving of a “knowing and willful” action.
Feel free to print off the above chart for your reference. However, see that little asterisk at the bottom of the chart? It applies here as well.
Come one! Come all! Step right up to be one of the first 6 states to test the new Medicare-Medicaid Affordable Care Act (ACO) pilot program.
Let your elderly population be the guinea pigs for the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Let your most needy population be the lab rats for CMS.
On December 15, 2016, CMS announced its intent to create Medicare/caid ACOs. Currently, Medicare ACOs exist, and if your physician has opted to participate in a Medicare ACO, then, most likely, you understand Medicare ACOs. Medicare ACOs are basically groups of physicians – of different service types – who voluntarily decide (but only after intense scrutiny by their lawyers of the ACO contract) to collaborate care with the intent of higher quality and lower cost care. For example, if your primary care physician participates in a Medicare ACO and you suffer intestinal issues, your primary care doctor would coordinate with a GI specialist within the Medicare ACO to get you an appointment. Then the GI specialist and your physician would share medical records, including test results and medication management. The thought is that the coordination of care will decrease duplicative tests, ensure appointments are made and kept, and prevent losing medical records or reviewing older, moot records.
Importantly, the Medicare beneficiary retains all benefits of “normal” Medicare and can choose to see any physician who accepts Medicare. The ACO model is a shift from “fee-for-service” to a risk-based, capitated amount in which quality of care is rewarded.
On the federal level, there have not been ACOs specially created for dual-eligible recipients; i.e., those who qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid…until now.
The CMS is requesting states to volunteer to participate in a pilot program instituting Medicare/Medicaid ACOs. CMS is looking for 6 brave states to participate. States may choose from three options for when the first 12-month performance period for the Medicare-Medicaid ACO Model will begin for ACOs in the state: January 1, 2018; January 1, 2019; or January 1, 2020.
Any state is eligible to apply, including the District of Columbia. But if the state wants to participate in the first round of pilot programs, intended to begin 2018, then that state must submit its letter of intent to participate by tomorrow by 11:59pm. See below.
I tried to research which states have applied, but was unsuccessful. If anyone has the information, I would appreciate it if you could forward it to me.
Participating in an ACO, whether it is only Medicare and Medicare/caid, can create a increase in revenue for your practices. Since you bear some risk, you also reap some benefit if you able to control costs. But, the decision to participate in an ACO should not be taken lightly. Federal law yields harsh penalties for violations of Anti-Kickback and Stark laws (which, on a very general level, prohibits referrals among physicians for any benefit). However, there are safe harbor laws and regulations specific to ACOs that allow exceptions. Regardless, do not ever sign a contract to participate in an ACO without an attorney reviewing it.
Food for thought – CMS’ Medicare/caid ACO Model may exist only “here in this [Obama] world. Here may be the last ever to be seen of [healthcare.gov] and their [employee mandates]. Look for it only in [history] books, for it may be no more than a [Obamacare] remembered, a [health care policy] gone with the wind…”
As, tomorrow (January 20, 2017) is the presidential inauguration. The winds may be a’changing…
Dr. Isaac Kojo Anakwah Thompson, a Florida primary care physician, was sentenced in July 2016 to 4 years in prison and a subsequent two years of supervised release. Dr. Thompson pled guilty to health care fraud. He was further ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,114,332.33. Ouch!! What did he do?
According to the Department of Justice, Dr. Thompson falsely reported that 387 of his clients suffered from ankylosing spondylitis when they did not.
Question: How does faking a patient’s disease make a physician money???
Answer: Hierarchal condition category (HCC) coding. Wait, what?
Basically, Medicare Advantage assigns HCC coding to each patient depending on the severity of their illnesses. Higher HCC scores equals substantially higher monthly capitation payments from Medicare to the managed care organization (MCO). In turn, the MCO will pay physicians more who have more extremely sick patients (higher HCC codes).
Ankylosing spondylitis is a form of arthritis that causes inflammation and damage at the joints; eventually, the inflamed spinal joints can become fused, or joined together so they can’t move independently. It’s a rare disease, affecting 1 in 1000 people. And, importantly, it sports a high HCC code.
In this case, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) found it odd that, between 2006-2010, Dr. Thompson diagnosed 387 Medicare Advantage beneficiaries with ankylosing spondylitis and treated them with such rare disease. To which, I say, if you’re going to defraud the Medicare system, choose common, fabricated diseases (kidding – it’s called sarcasm – I always have to add a disclaimer for people with no humor).
According to the Department of Justice, none or very few of Dr. Thompson’s 387 consumers actually had ankylosing spondylitis.
My issue is as follows: Doesn’t the managed care organization (MCO) share in some of the punishment? Shouldn’t the MCO have to repay the financial benefit it reaped from Dr. Thompson?? Shouldn’t the MCO have a duty to report such oddities?
Let me explain:
In Florida, Humana acted as the MCO. Every dollar that Dr. Thompson received was funneled through Humana. Humana would pay Dr. Thompson a monthly capitation fee from Medicare Advantage based on his patient’s hierarchal condition category (HCC) coding. Increasing even just one patient’s HCC code means more bucks for Dr. Thompson. Remember, according to the DOJ, he increased 387 patients’ HCC codes.
Dr. Thompson reported these diagnoses to Humana, which in turn reported them to Medicare. Consequently, Medicare paid approximately $2.1 million in excess capitation fees to Humana, approximately 80% of which went to Dr. Thompson.
In this case, it is reasonable to expect that Humana had knowledge that Dr. Thompson reported abnormally high HCCs for his patients. For comparison, ankylosing spondylitis has an HCC score of 0.364, which is more than an aortic aneurysm and three times as high as diabetes. Plus, look at the amount of money that the MCO paid Dr. Thompson. Surely, it appeared irregular.
What, if anything, is the MCO’s duty to report physicians with an abnormally high number of high HCC codes? If you have knowledge of someone committing a crime and you do nothing, isn’t that called aiding and abetting?
With the publication of the Yates memo, I expect to see CMS holding MCOs and other state agencies accountable for the actions of its providers. Not to say that the MCOs should actively, independently investigate Medicare/caid fraud, but to notify the Human Services Department (HSD) if abnormalities exist, especially if as blatant as one doctor with 387 patients suffering from ankylosing spondylitis.