Category Archives: Injunctions

Provider Medicaid Contract Termination Reversed in Court!

First and foremost, important, health care news:

The Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) have full authority to renew post-payments reviews of dates of service (DOS) during the COVID pandemic. The COVID pause is entirely off. It is going to be a mess to wade through the thousands of exceptions. RAC audits of COVID DOS will be, at best, placing a finger on a piece of mercury. I hope that the auditors remember that everyone was scrambling to do their best during the past year and a half. In the upcoming weeks, I will keep you posted.

I am especially excited today. Last week, I won a permanent injunction for a health care facility that but for this injunction, the facility would be closed, its 300 staff unemployed, and its 600 Medicare and Medicaid consumers without access to their mental health and substance abuse providers, their primary care physicians, and the Suboxone clinic. The Judge’s clerk emailed us on Friday. The email was terse although the clerk signified that the email was important by clicking the little, red, exclamation point. It simply stated: After speaking with Judge X, she is dismissing the government’s MTD and granting Petitioner’s permanent injunction. Petitioner’s counsel can send a proposed decision within 10 days. Such a simple email affected so many lives!

We hear Ellen Fink-Samnick MSW, ACSW, LCSW, CCM, CRP, speak about social determinants of health (SDoH) on RACMonitor. Well, this company is minority-owned and the mass percentage of staff and consumers are minorities.

Why was this company on the brink of closing down? The managed care organization (MCO) terminated the company’s Medicaid contract. Medicaid comprised the majority of its revenue. The MCO’s reason was that the company violated 42 CFR §455.106, which states:

“Information that must be disclosed. Before the Medicaid agency enters into or renews a provider agreement, or at any time upon written request by the Medicaid agency, the provider must disclose to the Medicaid agency the identity of any person who:

(1) Has ownership or control interest in the provider, or is an agent or managing employee of the provider; and

(2) Has been convicted of a criminal offense related to that person‘s involvement in any program under Medicare, Medicaid, or the title XX services program since the inception of those programs.”

The former CEO – for years – he relied on professional tax accountants for the company’s taxes and his own personal family’s taxes. His wife, who is a physician, relied on her husband to do their personal taxes as one of his “honey-do” tasks. CEO relied on a sub-par accountant for a couple years and pled guilty to failing to pay personal taxes for two years. The plea ended up in the newspaper and the MCO terminated the facility.

We argued that the company, as an entity, was bigger than just the CEO. Quickly, we filed for a TRO to keep the company open. Concurrently, we transitioned the company from the CEO to Dr. wife. Dr became CEO in a seamless transition. A long-time executive stepped up as HR management.

Yet, according to testimony, the MCO terminated the company’s contract when the newspaper published the article about CEO’s guilty plea. The article was published in a local paper on April 9 and the termination notice was sent out April 19th. It was a quick decision.

We argued that 42 CFR §455.106 didn’t apply because CEO’s guilty plea was:

  1. Personal and not related to Medicare or Medicaid; and
  2. Not a conviction but a voluntary plea agreement.

The Judge agreed. We won the TRO for immediate relief. After a four-day hearing and 22 witnesses for Petitioner, we won the preliminary injunction. At this point, the MCO hired outside counsel with our tax dollars, which I did bring up in the final hearing on the merits.

New outside counsel was super excited to be involved. He immediately propounded a ton of discovery asking for things that he already had and for criminal documents that we had no access to because, by law, the government has possession of and CEO never had. Well, new lawyer was really excited, so he filed motions to compel us to produce these unobtainable documents. He filed for sanctions. We filed for sanctions back.

It grew more litigious as the final hearing on the merits approached.

Finally, we presented our case for a permanent injunction, emphasizing the importance of the company and the smooth transition to the new, Dr. CEO. We won! Because we won, the company is open and providing medically necessary services to our most needy population.

And…I get to draft the proposed decision.

Premature Recoupment of Medicare Reimbursements Defies Due Process!

Who knows that – regardless your innocence –the government can and will recoup your funds preemptively at the third level of Medicare appeals. This flies in the face of the elements of due process. However, courts have ruled that the redetermination and the reconsideration levels afford the providers enough due process, which entails notice and an opportunity to be heard. I am here to tell you – that is horse manure. The first two levels of a Medicare appeal are hoops to jump through in order to get to an independent tribunal – the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The odds of winning at the 1st or 2nd level Medicare appeal is next to zilch, although often you can get the alleged amount reduced. The first level is before the same entity that found you owe the money. Auditors are normally not keen on overturning themselves. The second level is little better. The first time that you present to an independent tribunal is at the third level.

Between 2009 and 2014, the number of ALJ appeals increased more than 1,200 percent. And the government recoups all alleged overpayments before you ever get before an ALJ.

In a recent case, Sahara Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, 975 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2020), a home health care provider brought an action against Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and Administrator for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), asserting that its statutory and due process rights were violated and that defendants acted ultra vires by recouping approximately $2.4 million in Medicare overpayments without providing a timely ALJ hearing. HHS moved to dismiss, and the provider moved to amend, for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction, and for an expedited hearing.

The case was thrown out, concluding that adequate process had been provided and that defendants had not exceeded statutory authority, and denied provider’s motion for injunctive relief and to amend. The provider appealed and lost again.

What’s the law?

Congress prohibited HHS from recouping payments during the first two stages of administrative review. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(2)(A).

If repayment of an overpayment would constitute an “extreme hardship, as determined by the Secretary,” the agency “shall enter into a plan with the provider” for repayment “over a period of at least 60 months but … not longer than 5 years.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(1)(A). That hardship safety valve has some exceptions that work against insolvent providers. If “the Secretary has reason to believe that the provider of services or supplier may file for bankruptcy or otherwise cease to do business or discontinue participation” in the Medicare program, then the extended repayment plan is off the table. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(1)(C)(i). A provider that ultimately succeeds in overturning an overpayment determination receives the wrongfully recouped payments with interest. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(2)(B). The government’s interest rate is high. If you do have to pay back the alleged overpayment prematurely, the silver lining is that you may receive extra money for your troubles.

The years-long back log, however, may dwindle. The agency has received a funding increase, and currently expects to clear the backlog by 2022. In fact, the Secretary is under a Mandamus Order requiring such a timetable. 

A caveat regarding this grim news. This was in the Fifth Circuit. Other Courts disagree. The Fourth Circuit has held that providers do have property interests in Medicare reimbursements owed for services rendered, which is the correct holding. Of course, you have a property interest in your own money. An allegation of wrongdoing does not erase that property interest. The Fourth Circuit agrees with me.

Medicaid Suspension Lifted Because No Evidence of Intent!

Happy 2021! I bring great news and good tidings. I’m fairly sure that everyone reading is educated in what a preliminary injunction is and how important it can be for a health care provider falsely accused of credible allegations of fraud to lift the mandatory suspension of reimbursements. Finally, over the holidays, a Judge found that an indication of intent is required for an accusation of credible allegations of fraud, unlike past cases in which a mere accusation results in suspensions. 42 CFR §455.23 mandates that a health care provider’s reimbursements be suspended based on “credible allegations of fraud.” Which is a low bar. My client, an oral surgeon, had a disgruntled employee complaint and a baseless PCG audit of $6k. A double threat.

For those who are not in the know: An injunction is an extraordinary legal tool that allows the judge to suspend whatever bad action the government or one of its auditors do.

You have to prove:

  1. Likelihood of success on the merits
  2. Irreparable harm
  3. Balance of equities
  4. Public Interest.

I would guestimate that only 10-20% of requests for TROs and PIs are granted. Last week, we won for the oral surgeon. Everyone can learn from his success. This is how we won. Let me set the stage. We have an oral surgeon who underwent an infamous PCG audit resulting in an alleged $6k overpayment. PCG concurrently sends his data to program integrity, and one month later and without any notice, his reimbursements are suspended based on a “credible allegation of fraud.” Concurrently, he had a disgruntled employee threatening him.

Remember that the bar to demonstrate “credible allegation of fraud” is amazingly low. It is an “indicia of reliability.” An inaccurate PCG audit and a disgruntled employee, in this case, were the catalyst for the oral surgeon’s Medicaid reimbursements. His practice comprised of 80% Medicaid, so the suspension would cause irreparable harm to the practice.

We filed a TRO, PI, and Motion to Stay. The day before Christmas, we had trial.

The Judge ruled that the Department cannot just blindly rely on an anonymous accusation. There has to be some sort of investigation. It is not OK to accept accusations at face value without any sort of independent fact-checking. The Judge created an additional burden for the Department in cases of accusations of fraud that is not present in the regulation. But it is logical and reasonable to expect the Department to explore the accusations. The Judge emphasized that fraud requires intent. He also pointed out that fraud is not defined in the regulations. He emphasized that billing errors are not intentional acts.

The Judge held that, “[i]n light of the large number of Medicaid beneficiaries treated by the Petitioner’s practice, the rarity of the physician’s skills, and the apparent demand for those services, the relatively small amount of money now or formally in controversy, the lack of evidence of actual fraud and the contrary indications, the high probability that good cause exists for not suspending Petitioner’s Medicaid payments, and the near certainty of irreparable harm to the Petitioner if the relief is not granted, a TRO should be granted.”

Even better, the Judge ordered that the surgeon did not have to put up a bond, which is normally required by law. By the stroke of the Judge’s pen, the surgeon could go back to work performing medically necessary services to Medicaid recipients, which, by the way is rare for an oral surgeon to accept Medicaid. This is a success for health care providers. Accusations of fraud should require independent corroboration and evidence of intent.

Termination Underway for Virginia Medicaid Behavioral Health Care Providers!

As Virginia Medicaid behavioral health care providers are being terminated, the question remains, is it legal?

Virginia behavioral health care providers that accept Medicaid are under statewide blanket fire.

Without warning or provocation, the Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) recently began a mass firing, terminating all Medicaid behavioral health care providers “without cause.” Since the terminations involved multiple MCOs that were not ostensibly connected by business organization, involving providers across the state, it became immediately clear that the MCOs may have planned the terminations together.

Why are the MCOs doing this, you might ask? If you were charged with managing a firehose of Medicaid dollars, would you rather deal with 100 small providers or two large providers? This appears to be discrimination based on size.

Thankfully, for the behavioral healthcare providers of Virginia, they had an association, which is run by a tenacious woman with energy like the Energizer Bunny and passion like a tsunami. Caliber Virginia is the association heading the defense.

This is not my first rodeo with large-scale litigation regarding Medicare or Medicaid. I represented four behavioral healthcare providers in the New Mexico debacle through the administrative process. I have brought class-action lawsuits based on the computer software program implemented by the state to manage Medicaid funds. I have been successful in federal courts in obtaining federal injunctions staying terminations of Medicaid provider contracts.

Since I was contacted by Caliber Virginia, I have reviewed multiple contracts between providers and MCOs, termination letters, and federal and state law, listened to the stories of the providers that are facing imminent closure, and brainstormed legal theories to protect the providers.

I came up with this – these MCOs cannot terminate these providers “without cause.” In fact, these MCOs cannot terminate these providers without good reason.

Under numerous Supreme Court holdings, most notably the Court’s holding in Board of Regents v. Roth, the right to due process under the law only arises when a person has a property or liberty interest at stake.

In determining whether a property interest exists, a Court must first determine that there is an entitlement to that property. Unlike liberty interests, property interests and entitlements are not created by the Constitution. Instead, property interests are created by federal or state law, and can arise from statute, administrative regulations, or contract.

Specifically, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that North Carolina Medicaid providers have a property interest in continued provider status. In Bowens v. N.C. Dept. of Human Res., the Fourth Circuit recognized that the North Carolina provider appeals process created a due-process property interest in a Medicaid provider’s continued provision of services, and could not be terminated “at the will of the state.” The Court determined that these due process safeguards, which included a hearing and standards for review, indicated that the provider’s participation was not “terminable at will.” The Court held that these safeguards created an entitlement for the provider, because it limits the grounds for termination, only for cause, and that such cause was reviewable. The Fourth Circuit reached the same result in Ram v. Heckler two years later. I foresee the same results in other appellate jurisdictions, but definitely again within the Fourth Circuit.

Since Ram, North Carolina Medicaid providers’ rights to continued participation has been strengthened through the passage of Chapter 108C. Chapter 108C expressly creates a right for existing Medicaid providers to challenge a decision to terminate participation in the Medicaid program in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). It also makes such reviews subject to the standards of Article 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Therefore, North Carolina law now contains a statutory process that confers an entitlement to Medicaid providers. Chapter 108C sets forth the procedure and substantive standards for which OAH is to operate, and gives rise to the property right recognized in Bowens and Ram. Similarly, the Virginia law provides an appeal process for providers to follow in accordance with the Virginia Administrative Process Act.  See VA Code § 32.1-325 and 12 VAC 30-121-230.

In another particular case, a Medicare Administrative Contractor (MAC) terminated a provider’s ability to deliver four CPT® codes, which comprised of over 80 percent of the provider’s bailiwick, severely decreasing the provider’s funding source, not to mention costing Medicare recipients’ access to care and choice of provider.

The MAC’s contention was that the provider was not really terminated, since they could still participate in the network in ways. But the company was being terminated from providing certain services.

The Court found that the MAC’s contention that providers have no right to challenge a termination was without merit. And, rightfully so, the Court stated that if the MAC’s position were correct, the appeals process provided by law would be meaningless. This was certainly not the case.

The MAC’s contention that it operates a “closed network” and thus can terminate a provider at its sole discretion was also not supported by the law. No MAC or MCO can cite to any statute, regulation, or contract provision that gives it such authority. The statutory definition of “closed network” simply delineates those providers that have contracted with the Local Management Entity (LME) MCOs to furnish services to Medicaid enrollees. The MAC was relying on its own definition of “closed network” to exercise complete and sole control and discretion, which is without foundation and/or any merit. Nothing in the definition of “closed network” indicates that MACs or MCOs have absolute discretion to determine which existing providers can remain in the closed network.

It is well-settled law that there is a single state agency responsible for Medicare and Medicaid: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Case law dictates that the responsibility cannot be delegated away. A supervisory role, at the very least, must be maintained.

On the Medicaid level, 42 CFR § 438.214, titled “Provider Selection,” requires the state to ensure, through a contract, that each MCO PIHP (Prepaid Inpatient Health Plan) “implements written policies and procedures for selection and retention of providers.”) A plain reading of the law makes clear that MCOs that operate a PIHP are required to have written policies and procedures for retention of providers. Requiring policies and procedures would be pointless if they are not followed.

The Medicare Provider Manual and any the provisions of a request for proposal (RFP) must be adhered to, pursuant to the federal regulation and the state contracts. To the extent that Alliance’s policy states that it can decide not to retain a provider for any reason at its sole discretion, such a policy does not conform with federal law or the state requirements.

On the Medicare level, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) spells out the judicial review available to providers, which is made applicable to Medicare by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii. Section 405(h) aims to lay out the sole means by which a court may review decisions to terminate a provider agreement in compliance with the process available in § 405(g). Section 405(g) lays out the sole process of judicial review available in this type of dispute. The Supreme Court has endorsed the process, for nearly two decades, since its decision in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., holding that providers are required to abide by the provisions of § 405(g) providing for judicial review only after the administrative appeal process is complete.

The MACs and the MCOs cannot circumvent federal law and state requirements regarding provider retention by creating a policy that allows them to make the determination for any reason in its sole discretion. Such a provision is tantamount to having no policies and procedures at all.

If you or someone you know is being terminated in Virginia, please contact me – kemanuel@potomasclaw.com, or Caliber Virginia – calibervaed@gmail.com.

Caliber Virginia, formerly known as the Association for Community-Based Service Providers (ACBP), was established in 2006 to provide support, resources, and information with a united, well-informed and engaged voice among the community-based behavioral and mental health service providers of the Commonwealth. Caliber Virginia represents organizations that provide health and human services and supports for children, adults, and families in the areas of mental health, substance use disorders, developmental disabilities, child and family health and well-being, and other related issue areas.  Its member providers deliver quality health and human services to over 500,000 of Virginia’s residents each year. Caliber Virginia promotes equal opportunity, economic empowerment, independent living, and political participation for people with disabilities, including mental health diagnoses.

Programming Note:

Listen to Knicole Emanuel’s live reporting on this story Monday, Sept. 23, 2019, on Monitor Monday, 10-10:30 a.m. EST.

First published on RACMonitor

RAC Audits: Alternatives to Litigation

Understanding why there’s a need for auditing the auditors.

I frequently encounter complaints by healthcare providers that when they are undergoing Recovery Audit Contractor (RAC), Medicare Administrative Contractor (MAC), and, more recently, the Targeted Probe-and-Educate (TPE) audits, the auditors are getting it wrong. That’s as in, during a RAC audit, the auditor finds claims noncompliant, for example, for not having medical necessity – but the provider knows unequivocally that the determination is dead wrong. So the question that I get from the providers is whether they have any legal recourse against the RAC or MAC finding noncompliance, besides going through the tedious administrative action, which we all know can take upwards of 5-7 years before reaching the third administrative level.

To which, now, upon a recent discovery in one of my cases, I would have responded that the only other option for relief would be obtaining a preliminary injunction in federal court. To prove a preliminary injunction in federal court, you must prove: a) a likelihood of success on the merits; and b) that irreparable harm would be incurred without the injunction; i.e., that your company would be financially devastated, or even threatened with extinction.

The conundrum of being on the brink of financial ruin is that you cannot afford a legal defense if you are about to lose everything.

This past month, I had a completely different legal strategy, with a different result. I am not saying that this result would be reached by all healthcare providers that disagree with the results of their RAC or MAC or TPE audit, but I now believe that in certain extreme circumstances, this alternative route could work, as it did in my case.

When this particular client hired me, I quickly realized that the impact of the MAC’s decision to rescind the client’s Medicare contract was going to do more than the average catastrophic outcomes resulting from a rescission of a Medicare contract. First, this provider was the only provider in the area with the ability to perform certain surgeries. Secondly, his practice consisted of 90 percent of Medicare. An immediate suspension of Medicare would have been devastating to his practice. Thirdly, the consequence of these Medicaid patients not undergoing this particular and highly specialized surgery was dire. This trifecta sparked a situation in which, I believed, that even a Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) employee (who probably truly believed that the negative findings cited by the RAC or MAC were accurate) may be swayed by the exigent circumstances.

I contacted opposing counsel, who was the attorney for CMS. Prior to this situation, I had automatically assumed that non-litigious strategies would never work. Opposing counsel listened to the facts. She asked that I draft a detailed explanation as to the circumstances. Now, concurrently, I also drafted this provider’s Medicare appeal, because we did not want to lose the right to appeal. The letter was definitely detailed and took a lot of time to create.

In the end, CMS surprised me and we got the Medicare contract termination overturned within months, not years, and without expensive litigation.

(Originally published on RACMonitor)

Medicare “Site Neutral” Reimbursements Hit Hospitals Hard, But Is It Legal?

Shockingly, not all new rules that emerge from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) are actually compliant with the law. Wait! What? How can CMS publish Final Rules that are not compliant with the law?

This was an eye-opening discovery as a “baby lawyer” back 20 years ago. The government can and does publish and create Rules that, sometimes, exceed its legal authority. Of course, the Agency must follow appropriate rule-making procedure and allow for a comment period (etc.), but CMS does not have to listen to the comments. Theoretically, CMS could publish a Final Rule mandating that all Medicare providers provide 50 hours of free services a year or that the reimbursement rate for all services is $1. Both of my examples violate multiple rules, regulations, and laws, but until an aggrieved party with standing files a lawsuit declaring the Final Rule to be invalid or Congress passes a law that renders the Rule moot, the Rule exists and can be enforced by CMS and its agents.

The Rule-change (the “Site-Neutrality Rule”), which became effective January 1, 2019, reduced Medicare reimbursements to hospitals with outpatient facilities. Medicare will pay hospitals that have outpatient facilities “off campus” at a lower rate — equivalent to what it pays independent physicians for clinic visits. This decrease in Medicare reimbursements hits hard for most hospitals across the country, but, especially, rural hospitals. For the past 10+ years, hospitals have built outpatient facilities to serve more patients, and been reimbursed a higher Medicare reimbursement rate than independent physicians because the services at the hospital’s outpatient facility were connected to an outpatient facility affiliated with a hospital. Now the Site-Neutrality Rule leaves many hospitals trying to catch their breaths after the metaphoric punch to the belly. On the other hand, independent physicians claim that they have been providing the exact, same services as the hospital-affiliated outpatient facilities for years, but have received a lower reimbursement rate. I have no opinion (I do, but my opinion is not the topic in this blog) as to whether physicians and hospitals should be reimbursed equally – this blog is not pro-physician or pro-hospital. Rather, this blog is “pro-holding CMS liable to render Rules that follow the law.” Whether the hospitals or the physicians were receiving a cut in reimbursement rates, I am in favor of the those cuts (and future cuts) abiding by the law. Interestingly, should the AHA win this case, it could set solid, helpful, legal precedent for all types of providers and all types of decreased Medicare/caid reimbursements going forward.

Because of the Site-Neutrality Rule, in 2019, hospitals’ reimbursements will drop approximately $380 million and $760 million in 2020, according to CMS.

Before CMS brags on a decrease in the Medicare budget due to a proposed or Final Rule, it should remember that there is budget neutrality requirement when it comes to Rules implemented by CMS. 42 US.C. § 1395l. Yet, here, for the Site-Neutrality Rule, according to articles and journals, CMS is boasting its Site-Neutrality Rule as saving millions upon millions of dollars for Medicare. Can we say “Budget Non-Neutrality?”

The American Hospital Association filed a lawsuit December 2018 claiming that CMS exceeded its authority by implementing the Final Rule for “site neutral” Medicare reimbursements for hospitals with outpatient facilities. The lawsuit requests an injunction to stop the decrease and an order to repay any funds withheld thus far.

The claim, which, I believe has merit, argues that the Site-Neutrality Rule exceeds CMS’s statutory authority under the Medicare Act because of the budget neutrality mandate, in part – there are other arguments, but, for the sake of this blog, I am concentrating on the budget neutrality requirement. In my humble opinion, the budget neutrality requirement is overlooked by many attorneys and providers when it comes to challenging cuts to Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement rates.

On March 22, 2019, CMS filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative, a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 5, 2019, AHA (and the rest of the Plaintiffs) responded in opposition. On April 19, 2019, CMS responded to AHA’s response in opposition. The Judge has not ruled on the Motions, as of today, April 25, 2019.

Obviously, I will be keeping a close eye on the progress of this case going forward. In the meantime, more reductions in reimbursement rates are on the horizon…

Recently, CMS recently proposed three new rules that would further update the Medicare payment rates and quality reporting programs for hospices, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), and inpatient psychiatric facilities.

Stay tuned.

The Courts Order Medicare to Stop Recouping Alleged Overpayments Without Due Process!

New case law supports due process for Medicare providers. As first seen on RACMonitor.

Due process is one of the cornerstones of our society. Due process is the universal guarantee and found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and is applied to all states by the 14th Amendment. From this basic principle flows many legal decisions determining both procedural and substantive rights.

For Medicare and Medicaid providers, however, due process, in the past, has been nonexistent. Imagine that you are accused of owing $5 million to the government. Perhaps it was a CPT® code error. You disagree. You believe that your documentation was proper and that you filed for reimbursement correctly. You appeal the decision that you owe $5 million. You continue conducting business as normal. Suddenly, you realize the government is recouping the $5 million now. Prior to any hearing before a judge. You haven’t been found guilty. What happened to innocent until proven guilty? What happened to due process?

For Medicare appeals there is a five-step appeal process. The law requires the government not to recoup during the first and second levels of appeal. But the first and second levels are jumping through hoops and are not normally successful. It is at the third level – the appeal to an impartial administrative judge – that the alleged recoupments are overturned.

After the second level, according to the black letter of the law, the government can begin recouping the alleged overpayment.

Sadly, in the past, the courts have held that it is proper for the government to recoup reimbursements after the second level. Even though, no hearing has been held before an impartial judge and you haven’t been found guilty of owing the money.

On Sept. 27, 2018, another U.S. District Court in South Carolina has agreed with courts in Texas by granting a provider’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from recouping monies until after Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearings have been held (Accident, Injury and Rehabilitation, PC, c/a No. 4:18-cv-02173, September 27, 2018).

A new trend in favor of providers seems to be arising. This is fantastic news for providers across the country!

Accident, Injury & Rehab, PC found that the ALJ stage of the appellate process is the most important for providers, as it provides the first opportunity for plaintiff to cross examine defendant’s witnesses and examine the evidence used to formulate the statistical sample. According to the American Hospital Association (AHA), 66 percent of Recovery Audit Contractor (RAC) denials are reversed by an ALJ (I actually believe the percentage is higher). The court found that plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were violated by premature recoupment. The court granted Accident, Injury & Rehab, PC’s preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining the government from withholding Medicare payments during the appeal process.

When the government starts recouping filing a preliminary injunction has been shown it to be the best course.

In the past, most preliminary injunctions asking the court to order the government to stop recoupments until a hearing was held was dismissed based on jurisdiction. In other words, the courts held that the courts did not have the authority to render an opinion as to recoupments prior to a hearing. Now, however, the trend is turning, and courts are starting to rule in favor of the provider, finding a violation of procedural due process based on a collateral claim exception.

There are four criteria in order to win a preliminary injunction. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish all for the following criteria: (1) that the party is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that the party is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunction; (3) that the balance of the equity tips in the party’s favor; and (4) that injunction is in the public interest.

There is an esoteric legal theory called exhaustion of administrative remedies. So jurisdiction is the question. There are exceptions to the judicial bar. The Supreme Court of United States articulated a collateral claim exception. The Supreme Court permitted a plaintiff to bring a procedural due process claim requesting an evidentiary area hearing before the termination of disability benefits. There are nonwaivable and waivable jurisdictional elements the nonwaivable requirement is that a claim must be presented to the administrative agency. The waivable requirement is that administrative remedies be exhausted.

The Collateral claim exception is when a party brings a claim in federal court when that “constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to its substantive claim of entitlement.”

The new trend in case law is that the courts are finding that the provider’s right to not undergo recoupment during the appeal process is a collateral issue as to the substantive issue of whether the provider owes the money. Therefore, the courts have found jurisdiction as to the collateral issue.

The proverbial ship has sailed. According to courts in Texas and now South Carolina, CMS cannot recoup monies prior to hearings before ALJs. Providers facing large recoupments should file TROs to prevent premature recoupments and to obtain due process.

Hasty and Careless Termination Decisions Can Put Medicare/caid Providers Out of Business

When action happens in the Medicare/caid world, it happens quickly. Sometimes you do not receive adequate notice to coordinate continuity of care for your consumers or patients. For example, on August 3, 2018, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services announced that at midnight on August 18, 2018, it would be terminating the contract between CMS and ESEC, LLC, an Oklahoma-based surgery center.

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CMS provided ESEC 15 days notice of complete termination of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. Now I do not know the details of ESEC’s financial reliance on Medicare or Medicaid, but, these days, few providers are solely third-party pay or cash-only. I can only assume that ESEC is scrambling to initiate a lawsuit to remain afloat and open for business. Or ESEC is praying for a “rescind” by correcting whatever issues it purportedly had. Personally, I would not count on a possible rescind. I would be proactively seeking legal intervention.

Here are some examples of recent terminations and the notice received by the providers:

  • Baylor St. Luke’s Medical Center’s heart transplant program lost federal funding August 17, 2018. The hospital will no longer be able to bill Medicare and Medicaid for heart transplants.
  • Effective August 9, 2018, Brookwood Baptist Medical Center’s Medicare contract was terminated. The notice was published July 25, 2018.
  • As of August 12, 2018, The Grandview Nursing & Rehabilitation Facility’s Medicare contract was terminated. Notice of the termination was published August 1, 2018.
  • As of September 1, 2018, Compassus-Kansas City, a hospice company, will lose its Medicare contract. Notice was provided August 17, 2018.
  • On August 3, 2018, CMS announced that it was terminating Deligent Health Services Inc.’s Medicare and Medicaid contact, effective December 5, 2017. (That is quite a retroactive timeframe).

Can Careless Judy put a healthcare provider out of business?

This happens all the time. Sure, ESEC probably had knowledge that CMS was investigating it. However, CMS has the authority to issue these public notices of termination without holding a hearing to determine whether CMS’ actions are accurate. What if Careless Judy in Program Integrity made a human error and ESEC actually does meet the standards of care. But you see, Careless Judy accidentally used the minimum standards of care from 2008 instead of 2018. It’s an honest mistake. She had no malice against ESEC. But, my point is – where is the mechanism that prevents a surgical ambulatory center from going out of business – just because Careless Judy made a mistake?

To look into whether any legal mechanism exists to prevent Careless Judy from putting the ambulatory center out of business, I turn to the legal rules.

42 CFR 488.456 governs terminations of provider agreements. Subsection (a) state that termination “ends – (1) Payment to the facility; and (2) Any alternative remedy.”

Subsection (b) states that CMS or the State may terminate the contract with the provider if the provider “Is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of participation, regardless whether immediate jeopardy is present.” On the bright side, if no immediate jeopardy exists then CMS or the State must give 15 days notice. If there is found to be immediate jeopardy, the provider get 2 days. But who determines what is “substantial compliance?” Careless Judy?

42 CFR 489.53 lists the reasons on which CMS may rely to terminate a provider. Although, please note, that the regulations use the word “may” and not “must.” So we have some additional guidance as to when a provider’s contract may be terminated, but it still seems subjective. Here are the reasons:

  1. The provider is not complying with the provisions of title XVIII and the applicable regulations of this chapter or with the provisions of the agreement.
  2. The provider or supplier places restrictions on the persons it will accept for treatment and it fails either to exempt Medicare beneficiaries from those restrictions or to apply them to Medicare beneficiaries the same as to all other persons seeking care.
  3. It no longer meets the appropriate conditions of participation or requirements (for SNFs and NFs) set forth elsewhere in this chapter. In the case of an RNHCI no longer meets the conditions for coverage, conditions of participation and requirements set forth elsewhere in this chapter.
  4. It fails to furnish information that CMS finds necessary for a determination as to whether payments are or were due under Medicare and the amounts due.
  5. It refuses to permit examination of its fiscal or other records by, or on behalf of CMS, as necessary for verification of information furnished as a basis for payment under Medicare.
  6. It failed to furnish information on business transactions as required in § 420.205 of this chapter.
  7. It failed at the time the agreement was entered into or renewed to disclose information on convicted individuals as required in § 420.204 of this chapter.
  8. It failed to furnish ownership information as required in § 420.206 of this chapter.
  9. It failed to comply with civil rights requirements set forth in 45 CFR parts 80, 84, and 90.
  10. In the case of a hospital or a critical access hospital as defined in section 1861(mm)(1) of the Act that has reason to believe it may have received an individual transferred by another hospital in violation of § 489.24(d), the hospital failed to report the incident to CMS or the State survey agency.
  11. In the case of a hospital requested to furnish inpatient services to CHAMPUS or CHAMPVA beneficiaries or to veterans, it failed to comply with § 489.25 or § 489.26, respectively.
  12. It failed to furnish the notice of discharge rights as required by § 489.27.
  13. The provider or supplier refuses to permit copying of any records or other information by, or on behalf of, CMS, as necessary to determine or verify compliance with participation requirements.
  14. The hospital knowingly and willfully fails to accept, on a repeated basis, an amount that approximates the Medicare rate established under the inpatient hospital prospective payment system, minus any enrollee deductibles or copayments, as payment in full from a fee-for-service FEHB plan for inpatient hospital services provided to a retired Federal enrollee of a fee-for-service FEHB plan, age 65 or older, who does not have Medicare Part A benefits.
  15. It had its enrollment in the Medicare program revoked in accordance to § 424.535 of this chapter.
  16. It has failed to pay a revisit user fee when and if assessed.
  17. In the case of an HHA, it failed to correct any deficiencies within the required time frame.
  18. The provider or supplier fails to grant immediate access upon a reasonable request to a state survey agency or other authorized entity for the purpose of determining, in accordance with § 488.3, whether the provider or supplier meets the applicable requirements, conditions of participation, conditions for coverage, or conditions for certification.

As you can see from the above list of possible termination reasons, many of which are subjective, it could be easy for Careless Judy to terminate a Medicare contract erroneously, based on inaccurate facts, or without proper investigation.

The same is true for Medicaid; your contract can be terminated on the federal or state level. The difference is that at the state level, Careless Judy is a state employee, not a federal.

42 CFR 498.5 governs appeal rights for providers contract terminations. Subsection (b) states that “Any provider dissatisfied with an initial determination to terminate its provider agreement is entitled to a hearing before an ALJ.”

42 CFR 498.20 states that an initial determination by CMS (like a contract termination) is binding unless it is reconsidered per 42 CFR 498.24.

A Stay of the termination should suspend the termination until the provider can obtain a hearing by an impartial tribunal until the appeal has been completed. The appeal process and supposed automatic Stay of the termination is the only protection for the provider from Careless Judy. Or filing an expensive injunction.

COA Dismisses AHA 340B Lawsuit!

The 340B drug program is a topic that needs daily updates. It seems that something is happening constantly. Like a prime time soap opera or The Bachelor, the 340B program is all the talk at the water cooler. From lawsuits to legislation to executive orders – there is no way of knowing the outcome, so we all wait with bated breath to watch who will hold the final rose.

On Tuesday, July 17, 2018, the metaphoric guillotine fell on the American Hospital Association (AHA) and on hospitals across the country. The Court of Appeals (COA) dismissed AHA’s lawsuit.

The Background 

On November 1, 2017, the US Department of Health and Human Services released a Final Rule implementing a payment reduction for most covered outpatient drugs billed to Medicare by 340B-participating hospitals from the current Average Sales Price (ASP) plus 6% rate to ASP minus 22.5%, which represents a payment cut of almost 30%.

Effective January 1, 2018, the 30% slash in reimbursement rates became reality, but only for locations physically connected to participating hospitals. CMS is expected to broaden the 30% reduction to all 340B-participating entities in the near future.

What is the 340B drug program? The easiest explanation for the 340B program is that government insurance, Medicare and Medicaid, do not want to pay full price for medicine. In an effort to reduce costs of drugs for the government payors, the government requires that all drug companies enter into a rebate agreement with the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as a precondition for coverage of their drugs by Medicaid and Medicare Part B. If a drug manufacturer wants its drug to be prescribed to Medicare and Medicaid patients, then it must pay rebates.

The Lawsuit

The American Hospital Association (“AHA”) filed for an injunction last year requesting that the US District Court enjoin CMS from implementing the 340B payment reduction. On the merits, AHA argues that the HHS’s near-30% rate reduction constitutes an improper exercise of its statutory rate-setting authority.

The US District Court did not reach an opinion on the merits; it dismissed the case, issued December 29, 2017, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court found that: Whenever a provider challenges HHS, there is only one potential source of subject matter jurisdiction—42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Medicare Act places strict limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to decide ‘any claims arising under’ the Act.

The Supreme Court has defined two elements that a plaintiff must establish in order to satisfy § 405(g). First, there is a non-waivable, jurisdictional requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been “presented” to the Secretary. Without presentment, there is no jurisdiction.

The second element is a waivable requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. I call this legal doctrine the Monopoly requirement. Do not pass go. Go directly to jail. Do not collect $200. Unlike the first element, however, a plaintiff may be excused from this obligation when, for example, exhaustion would be futile. Together, § 405(g)’s two elements serve the practical purpose of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. However, there are ways around these obsolete legal doctrines in order to hold a state agency liable for adverse decisions.

Following the Dec. 29, 2017, order by the District Court, which dismissed the lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiffs (AHA) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals (COA), which promptly granted AHA’s request for an expedited appeal schedule.

In their brief, AHA contends that the District Court erred in dismissing their action as premature and that their continued actual damages following the Jan. 1 payment reduction’s effective date weighs heavily in favor of preliminary injunctive relief. More specifically, AHA argues that 30% reduction is causing irreparable injury to the plaintiffs “by jeopardizing essential programs and services provided to their communities and the vulnerable, poor and other underserved populations, such as oncology, dialysis, and immediate stroke treatment services.”

By contrast, the government’s brief rests primarily on jurisdictional arguments, specifically that: (1) the Medicare Act precludes judicial review of rate-setting activities by HHS; and (2) the District Court was correct that no jurisdiction exists.

Oral arguments in this appeal were May 4, 2018.

AHA posted in its newsletter that the COA seemed most interested in whether Medicare law precludes judicial review of CMS’ rule implementing the cuts. AHA says it hopes a ruling will be reached in the case sometime this summer.

In a completely different case, the DC District Court is contemplating a request to toll the time to file a Section 340B appeal.

AHA v. Azar, a case about RAC audits and the Medicare appeal backlog. During a March 22, 2018, hearing, the COA asked AHA to submit specific proposals that AHA wishes the COA to impose and why current procedures are insufficient. It was filed June 22, 2018.

In it proposal, AHA pointed out that HHS is needlessly causing hospitals to file thousands of protective appeals by refusing to toll the time for hospitals to file appeals arising out of the reduction in reimbursement that certain 340B hospitals. In order to avoid potential arguments from the government that 340B hospitals that do not administratively appeal the legality of a reduced rate will be time barred from seeking recovery if the court holds that the reduction in payments is unlawful, AHA proposed that the Secretary agree to toll the deadline for such appeals until resolution of the 340B litigation—an arrangement that would preserve the 340B hospitals’ right to full reimbursement in the event the 340B litigation is not successful. HHS has refused to toll the time, meaning that Section 340B hospitals will have to protect their interests in the interim by filing thousands upon thousands of additional claim appeals, which will add thousands upon thousands of more appeals to the current ALJ-level backlog.

The Decision

In a unanimous decision, three judges from the COA sided with HHS and ruled the hospitals’ suit was filed prematurely because hospitals had not formally filed claims with HHS because they were not yet experiencing cuts.

Basically, what the judges are saying is that you cannot ask for relief before the adverse action occurs. Even though the hospitals knew the 30% rate reduction would be implemented January 1, 2018, they had to wait until the pain was felt before they could ask for relief.

The lawsuit was not dismissed based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Decision noted that in some cases plaintiffs might be justified in seeking judicial review before they have exhausted their administrative remedies, but that wouldn’t be the solution here.

Hindsight is always 20-20. I read the 11 page decision. But I believe that AHA failed in two ways that may have changed the outcome: (1) Nowhere in the decision does it appear that the attorneys for AHA argued that the subject matter jurisdiction issue was collateral to the merits; and (2) The lawsuit was filed pre-January 1, 2018, but AHA could have amended its complaint after January 1, 2018, to show injury and argue that its comments were rejected (final decision) by the rule being implemented.

But, hey, we will never know.

5th Circuit Finds Subject Matter Jurisdiction For Medicare and Medicaid Providers – Why Collards Matter

“I’d like some spaghetti, please, and a side of meatballs.” – This sentence is illogical because meatballs are integral to spaghetti and meatballs. If you order spaghetti  – and -meatballs, you are ordering “spaghetti and meatballs.” Meatballs on the side is not a thing.

Juxtapose, a healthcare provider defending itself from an alleged overpayment, But during the appeal process undergoes a different penalty – the state or federal government begins to recoup future funds prior to a decision that the alleged recoupment is authorized, legal, or warranted. When a completely new issue unrelated to the allegation of overpayment inserts itself into the mix, then you have spaghetti and meatballs with a side of collard greens. Collard greens need to be appealed in a completely different manner than spaghetti and meatballs, especially when the collard greens could put the company out of business because of the premature and unwarranted recoupments without due process.

I have been arguing this for years based off of, not only, a 1976 Supreme Court case, but multiple state case law, as well as, success I have had in the federal and administrative courts, and BTW – logic.

On March 27, 2018, I was confirmed again. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a landmark case for Medicare and Medicaid providers across the country. The case, Family Rehab., Inc. v Azar, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 7668, involved a Medicare home health service provider, which was assessed for approximately $7.8 million in Medicare overpayments. Family Rehab, the plaintiff in the case, relied on 88% to 94% of its revenue from Medicare. The company had timely appealed the alleged overpayment, and it was at the third level of the Medicare five step process for appeals. See blog. But there is a 3 – 5 year backlog on the third level, and the government began to recoup the $7.8 million despite the ongoing appeal. If no action were taken, the company would be out of business well-before any ALJ could rule on the merits of the case, i.e. whether the recoupment was warranted. How is that fair? The provider may not owe $7.8 million, but before an objective tribunal decides what is actually owed, if anything, we are going to go ahead and take the money and reap the benefit of any interest accrued during the time it takes the provider to get a hearing.

The backlog for Medicare appeals at the ALJ level is unacceptably long. See blog and blog. However, the federal regulations only  prevent recoupment during the appeal process during the first and second levels. This is absolutely asinine and should be changed considering we do have a clause in the Constitution called “due process.” Purported criminals receive due process, but healthcare providers who accept Medicare or Medicaid, at times, do not.

At the third level of appeal, Family Rehab underwent recoupments, even though it was still appealing the decision, which immediately stifled Family Rehab’s income. Family Rehab, because of the premature recoupments, was at risk of losing everything, going bankrupt, firing its staff, and no longer providing medically necessary home health services for the elderly. This situation mimics a situation in which I represented a client in northern Indiana who was losing its Medicaid contract.  I also successfully obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the provider from losing its Medicaid contract. See blog.

It is important to note that in this case the ZPIC had audited only 43 claims. Then it used a statistical method to extrapolate the alleged over-billings and concluded that the alleged overpayment was $7,885,803.23. I cannot tell you how many times I have disputed an extrapolation and won. See blog.

42 USC 1395(f)(f)(d)(1)(A) states that the ALJ shall conduct and conclude the hearing and render a decision no later than 90 days after a timely request. Yet the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that an ALJ hearing would not be forthcoming not within 90 days or even 900 days. The judge noted in his decision that the Medicare appeal backlog for an ALJ hearing was 3 – 5 years. The District Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Family Rehab had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Family Rehab appealed.

On appeal, Family Rehab argued the same arguments that I have made in the past: (1) its procedural due process and ultra vires claims are collateral to the agency’s appellate process; and (2) going through the appellate process would mean no review at all because the provider would be out of business by the time it would be heard by an ALJ.

What does collateral mean? Collard greens are collateral. When you think collateral; think collards. Collard greens do not normally come with spaghetti and meatballs. A collateral issue is an issue that is entirely collateral to a substantive agency decision and would not be decided through the administrative appeal process. In other words, even if Family Rehab were to only pursue the $7.8 million overpayment issue through the administrative process, the issue of having money recouped and the damage to the company that the recoupment was causing would never be heard by the ALJ because those “collateral” issues are outside the ALJ’s purview. The premature recoupment issue could not be remedied by an ALJ. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

The collateral argument also applies to terminations of Medicare and Medicaid contracts without due process. In an analogous case (Affiliated Professional), the provider argued that the termination of its Medicare contract without due process violated its right to due process and the Equal Protection Clause and was successful.

The upshot is obvious, if the Court must examine the merits of the underlying dispute, delve into the statute and regulations, or make independent judgments as to plaintiff’s eligibility under a statute, the claim is not collateral.

The importance of this case is that it verifies my contention that if a provider is undergoing a recoupment or termination without due process, there is relief for that provider – an injunction stopping the premature recoupments or termination until due process has been completed.