When action happens in the Medicare/caid world, it happens quickly. Sometimes you do not receive adequate notice to coordinate continuity of care for your consumers or patients. For example, on August 3, 2018, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services announced that at midnight on August 18, 2018, it would be terminating the contract between CMS and ESEC, LLC, an Oklahoma-based surgery center.
CMS provided ESEC 15 days notice of complete termination of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. Now I do not know the details of ESEC’s financial reliance on Medicare or Medicaid, but, these days, few providers are solely third-party pay or cash-only. I can only assume that ESEC is scrambling to initiate a lawsuit to remain afloat and open for business. Or ESEC is praying for a “rescind” by correcting whatever issues it purportedly had. Personally, I would not count on a possible rescind. I would be proactively seeking legal intervention.
Here are some examples of recent terminations and the notice received by the providers:
- Baylor St. Luke’s Medical Center’s heart transplant program lost federal funding August 17, 2018. The hospital will no longer be able to bill Medicare and Medicaid for heart transplants.
- Effective August 9, 2018, Brookwood Baptist Medical Center’s Medicare contract was terminated. The notice was published July 25, 2018.
- As of August 12, 2018, The Grandview Nursing & Rehabilitation Facility’s Medicare contract was terminated. Notice of the termination was published August 1, 2018.
- As of September 1, 2018, Compassus-Kansas City, a hospice company, will lose its Medicare contract. Notice was provided August 17, 2018.
- On August 3, 2018, CMS announced that it was terminating Deligent Health Services Inc.’s Medicare and Medicaid contact, effective December 5, 2017. (That is quite a retroactive timeframe).
Can Careless Judy put a healthcare provider out of business?
This happens all the time. Sure, ESEC probably had knowledge that CMS was investigating it. However, CMS has the authority to issue these public notices of termination without holding a hearing to determine whether CMS’ actions are accurate. What if Careless Judy in Program Integrity made a human error and ESEC actually does meet the standards of care. But you see, Careless Judy accidentally used the minimum standards of care from 2008 instead of 2018. It’s an honest mistake. She had no malice against ESEC. But, my point is – where is the mechanism that prevents a surgical ambulatory center from going out of business – just because Careless Judy made a mistake?
To look into whether any legal mechanism exists to prevent Careless Judy from putting the ambulatory center out of business, I turn to the legal rules.
42 CFR 488.456 governs terminations of provider agreements. Subsection (a) state that termination “ends – (1) Payment to the facility; and (2) Any alternative remedy.”
Subsection (b) states that CMS or the State may terminate the contract with the provider if the provider “Is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of participation, regardless whether immediate jeopardy is present.” On the bright side, if no immediate jeopardy exists then CMS or the State must give 15 days notice. If there is found to be immediate jeopardy, the provider get 2 days. But who determines what is “substantial compliance?” Careless Judy?
42 CFR 489.53 lists the reasons on which CMS may rely to terminate a provider. Although, please note, that the regulations use the word “may” and not “must.” So we have some additional guidance as to when a provider’s contract may be terminated, but it still seems subjective. Here are the reasons:
- The provider is not complying with the provisions of title XVIII and the applicable regulations of this chapter or with the provisions of the agreement.
- The provider or supplier places restrictions on the persons it will accept for treatment and it fails either to exempt Medicare beneficiaries from those restrictions or to apply them to Medicare beneficiaries the same as to all other persons seeking care.
- It no longer meets the appropriate conditions of participation or requirements (for SNFs and NFs) set forth elsewhere in this chapter. In the case of an RNHCI no longer meets the conditions for coverage, conditions of participation and requirements set forth elsewhere in this chapter.
- It fails to furnish information that CMS finds necessary for a determination as to whether payments are or were due under Medicare and the amounts due.
- It refuses to permit examination of its fiscal or other records by, or on behalf of CMS, as necessary for verification of information furnished as a basis for payment under Medicare.
- It failed to furnish information on business transactions as required in § 420.205 of this chapter.
- It failed at the time the agreement was entered into or renewed to disclose information on convicted individuals as required in § 420.204 of this chapter.
- It failed to furnish ownership information as required in § 420.206 of this chapter.
- It failed to comply with civil rights requirements set forth in 45 CFR parts 80, 84, and 90.
- In the case of a hospital or a critical access hospital as defined in section 1861(mm)(1) of the Act that has reason to believe it may have received an individual transferred by another hospital in violation of § 489.24(d), the hospital failed to report the incident to CMS or the State survey agency.
- In the case of a hospital requested to furnish inpatient services to CHAMPUS or CHAMPVA beneficiaries or to veterans, it failed to comply with § 489.25 or § 489.26, respectively.
- It failed to furnish the notice of discharge rights as required by § 489.27.
- The provider or supplier refuses to permit copying of any records or other information by, or on behalf of, CMS, as necessary to determine or verify compliance with participation requirements.
- The hospital knowingly and willfully fails to accept, on a repeated basis, an amount that approximates the Medicare rate established under the inpatient hospital prospective payment system, minus any enrollee deductibles or copayments, as payment in full from a fee-for-service FEHB plan for inpatient hospital services provided to a retired Federal enrollee of a fee-for-service FEHB plan, age 65 or older, who does not have Medicare Part A benefits.
- It had its enrollment in the Medicare program revoked in accordance to § 424.535 of this chapter.
- It has failed to pay a revisit user fee when and if assessed.
- In the case of an HHA, it failed to correct any deficiencies within the required time frame.
- The provider or supplier fails to grant immediate access upon a reasonable request to a state survey agency or other authorized entity for the purpose of determining, in accordance with § 488.3, whether the provider or supplier meets the applicable requirements, conditions of participation, conditions for coverage, or conditions for certification.
As you can see from the above list of possible termination reasons, many of which are subjective, it could be easy for Careless Judy to terminate a Medicare contract erroneously, based on inaccurate facts, or without proper investigation.
The same is true for Medicaid; your contract can be terminated on the federal or state level. The difference is that at the state level, Careless Judy is a state employee, not a federal.
42 CFR 498.5 governs appeal rights for providers contract terminations. Subsection (b) states that “Any provider dissatisfied with an initial determination to terminate its provider agreement is entitled to a hearing before an ALJ.”
42 CFR 498.20 states that an initial determination by CMS (like a contract termination) is binding unless it is reconsidered per 42 CFR 498.24.
A Stay of the termination should suspend the termination until the provider can obtain a hearing by an impartial tribunal until the appeal has been completed. The appeal process and supposed automatic Stay of the termination is the only protection for the provider from Careless Judy. Or filing an expensive injunction.
Letter to HHS: RAC Audits “Have Absolutely No Direct Impact on the Medicare Providers” – And I Spotted Elvis!
“Recovery audits have absolutely no direct impact on the Medicare providers working hard to deliver much needed healthcare services to beneficiaries.“
And Elvis Presley is still alive! Oh, and did you know that Bill Clinton never had an affair on Hillary? (since when has her name become one word, like Prince or Beyonce?)
This sentence was written in a March 6, 2018, correspondence from The Council for Medicare Integrity to HHS Secretary Alex Azar.
“Recovery auditing has never been an impediment to the delivery of healthcare services nor is it an intrusion in the physician-patient relationship.” – Kristin Walter of The Council for Medicare Integrity. BTW, Ms. Walter, health care has a space between the two syllables.
The purpose of this letter that was sent from the The Council for Medicare Integrity to Secretary Azar was to request an increase of prepayment reviews for Medicare providers. For those of you so blessed to not know what a prepayment review, prepayment review is a review of your Medicare (or Caid) claims prior to being paid. It sounds reasonable on paper, but, in real life, prepayment review is a Draconian, unjust, and preposterous tool aimed at putting healthcare providers out of business, or if not aimed, is the unknown or accidental outcome of such a review. If placed on prepayment review, your Medicare or Medicaid reimbursements are 100% cut off. Gone. Like the girl in that movie with Ben Affleck, Gone Girl Gone, and, like the girl, not really gone because it’s alive – you provided services and are owed that money – but it’s in hiding and may ruin your life. See blog.
Even if I were wrong, which I am not, the mere process in the order of events of prepayment review is illogical. In the interest of time, I will cut-and-paste a section from a prior blog that I wrote about prepayment review:
In real-life, prepayment review:
- The auditors may use incorrect, inapplicable, subjective, and arbitrary standards.
I had a case in which the auditors were denying 100% ACTT services, which are 24-hour mental health services for those 10% of people who suffer from extreme mental illness. The reason that the auditor was denying 100% of the claims was because “lower level services were not tried and ruled out.” In this instance, we have a behavioral health care provider employing staff to render ACTT services (expensive), actually rendering the ACTT services (expensive), and getting paid zero…zilch…nada…for a reason that is not required! There is no requirement that a person receiving ACTT services try a lower level of service first. If the person qualifies for ACTT, the person should receive ACTT services. Because of this auditor’s misunderstanding of ACTT, this provider was almost put out of business.
Another example: A provider of home health was placed on prepayment review. Again, 90 – 100% of the claims were denied. In home health, program eligibility is determined by an independent assessment conducted by the Division of Medical Assistance (DMA) via Liberty, which creates an individualized plan of care. The provider submitted claims for Patient Sally, who, according to her plan, needs help dressing. The service notes demonstrated that the in-home aide helped Sally dress with a shirt and pants. But the auditor denies every claim the provider bills for Sally (which is 7 days a week) because, according to the service note, the in-home aide failed to check the box to show she/he helped put on Sally’s shoes. The auditor fails to understand that Sally is a double amputee – she has no feet.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes – Who watches the watchmen???
- The administrative burden placed on providers undergoing prepayment review is staggering.
In many cases, a provider on prepayment review is forced to hire contract workers just to keep up with the number of document requests coming from the entity that is conducting the prepayment review. After initial document requests, there are supplemental document requests. Then every claim that is denied needs to be re-submitted or appealed. The amount of paperwork involved in prepayment review would cause an environmentalist to scream and crumple into the fetal position like “The Crying Game.”
- The accuracy ratings are inaccurate.
Because of the mistakes the auditors make in erroneously denying claims, the purported “accuracy ratings” are inaccurate. My daughter received an 86 on a test. Given that she is a straight ‘A’ student, this was odd. I asked her what she got wrong, and she had no idea. I told her to ask her teacher the next day why she received an 86. Oops. Her teacher had accidentally given my daughter an 86; the 86 was the grade of another child in the class with the same first name. In prepayment review, the accuracy ratings are the only method to be removed from prepayment, so the accuracy of the accuracy ratings is important. One mistaken, erroneously denied claim damages the ratings, and we’ve already discussed that mistakes/errors occur. You think, if a mistake is found, call up the auditing entity…talk it out. See below.
- The communication between provider and auditor do not exist.
Years ago my mom and I went to visit relatives in Switzerland. (Not dissimilar to National Lampoon’s European Vacation). They spoke German; we did not. We communicated with pictures and hand gestures. To this day, I have no idea their names. This is the relationship between the provider and the auditor.
Assuming that the provider reaches a live person on the telephone:
“Can you please explain to me why claims 1-100 failed?”
“Don’t you know the service definitions and the policies? That is your responsibility.”
“Yes, but I believe that we follow the policies. We don’t understand why these claims are denied. That’s what I’m asking.”
“Read the policy.”
- The financial burden on the provider is devastating.
If a provider’s reimbursements are 80 – 100% reliant on Medicaid/care and those funds are frozen, the provider cannot meet payroll. Yet the provider is expected to continue to render services. A few years ago, I requested from NC DMA a list of providers on prepayment review and the details surrounding them. I was shocked at the number of providers that were placed on prepayment review and within a couple months ceased submitting claims. In reality, what happened was that those providers were forced to close their doors. They couldn’t financially support their company without getting paid.
Back to the current blog
So to have The Council for Medicare Integrity declare that prepayment review has absolutely no impact on Medicare providers is ludicrous.
Now, I will admit that the RAC (and other acronyms) prepayment and post payment review programs have successfully recovered millions of dollars of alleged overpayments. But these processes must be done right, legally. You can’t just shove an overzealous, for-profit, audit company out the door like an overweight kid in a candy store. Legal due process and legal limitations must be required – and followed.
Ms. Walter does present some interesting, yet factually questionable, statistics:
- “Over the past 5 years alone, Medicare has lost more than $200 billion taxpayer dollars to very preventable billing errors made by providers.”
Not quite sure how this was calculated. A team of compliance auditors would have had to review hundreds of thousands of medical records to determine this amount. Is she referring to money that has been recovered and the appeal process afforded to the providers has been exhausted? Or is this number how much money is being alleged has been overpaid? How exactly were these supposed billing errors “very preventable?” What does that mean? She is either saying that the health care providers could have prevented the ostensible overbillings – or – she is saying that RAC auditors could have prevented these purported overbillings by increased prepayment review. Either way … I don’t get it. It reminds me of Demi Moore in A Few Good Men, “I object.” Judge states, “Overruled.” Demi Moore pleads, “I strenuously object.” Judge states, “Still overruled.” “Very preventable billing errors,” said Ms. Walters. “Still overruled.”
- “Currently, only 0.5 percent of Medicare claims are reviewed, on a post-payment basis, for billing accuracy and adherence to program billing rules. This leaves 99.5 percent of claims immune from any checks and balances that would ensure Medicare payments are correct.”
Again, I am curious as to the mathematic calculation used. Is she including the audits performed, not only by RACs, but audits by ZPICs, CERTS, MACs, including Palmetto, Noridian and CGS, federal and state Program Integrities, State contractors, MFCUs, MICs, MCOs, PERMs, PCG, and HHS? Because I can definitely see that we need more players.
- “The contrast between Medicare review practices and private payers is startling. Despite the dire need to safeguard Medicare dollars, CMS currently allows Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) to review fewer than 30 Medicare claim types (down from 800 claim types initially) and has scaled back to allow a review of a mere 0.5 percent of Medicare provider claims after they have been paid. Considered a basic cost of doing business, the same providers billing Medicare comply, without issue, with the more extensive claim review requirements of private health insurance companies. With Medicare however, provider groups have lobbied aggressively to keep their overpayments, putting intense pressure on CMS to block Medicare billing oversight.”
Did I wake up in the Twilight Zone? Zombies? Let’s compare Medicare/caid to private health care companies.
First, let’s talk Benjamins (or pennies in Medicare/caid). A study was conducted to compare Texas Medicare/caid reimbursement rates to private pay. Since everything is bigger in Texas, including the reimbursement rates for Medicare/caid, I figured this study is demonstrative for the country (obviously each state’s statistics would vary).
According to a 2016 study by the National Comparisons of Commercial and Medicare Fee-For-Service Payments to Hospitals:
- 96%. In 2012, average payments for commercial inpatient hospital stays were higher than Medicare fee-for-service payments for 96% of the diagnosis related groups (DRGs) analyzed.
- 14%. Between 2008 and 2012, the commercial-to-Medicare payment difference had an average increase of 14%.
- 86%. Longer hospital stays do not appear to be a factor for higher average commercial payments. During this period, 86 percent of the DRGs analyzed had commercial-to-Medicare average length-of-stay of ratios less than one.
The “basic cost of doing business” for Medicare/caid patients is not getting appropriate reimbursement rates.
The law states that the reimbursements rates should allow quality of care. Section 30(A) of the Medicare Act requires that each State “provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan (including but not limited to utilization review plans as provided for in section 1396b(i)(4) of this title) as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area.” (emphasis added).
Second, billing under Medicare/caid is much more complex than billing third-party payors, which are not required to follow the over-regulated, esoteric, administrative, spaghetti sauce that mandates providers who accept Medicare and/or Medicaid (a whole bunch of independent vegetables pureed into a sauce in which the vegetables are indiscernible from the other). The regulatory burden required of providing Medicare and/or Medicaid services does not compare to the administrative and regulatory burden associated with private pay, regardless of Ms. Walter’s uncited and unreferenced claims that “the more extensive claim review requirements [are with the] private health insurance companies.” We’re talking kumquats to rack of lamb (are kumquats cheap)?
Third, let’s discuss this comment: “provider groups have lobbied aggressively.” RAC auditors, and all the other alphabet soup, are paid A LOT. Government bureaucracy often does not require the same “bid process” that a private company would need to pass. Some government contracts are awarded on a no-bid process (not ok), which does not create the best “bang for your buck for the taxpayers.”
I could go on…but, I believe that you get the point. My readers are no dummies!
I disagree with the correspondence, dated March 6, 2018, from The Council for Medicare Integrity to HHS Secretary Alex Azar is correct. However, my question is who will push back against The Council for Medicare Integrity? All those health care provider associations that “have lobbied aggressively to keep their overpayments, putting intense pressure on CMS to block Medicare billing oversight.”?
At the end of the day (literally), I questioned the motive of The Council for Medicare Integrity. Whenever you question a person’s motive, follow the money. So, I googled “who funds The Council for Medicare Integrity? Unsurprisingly, it was difficult to locate. According to The Council for Medicare Integrity’s website it provides transparency with the following FAQ:
Again, do you see why I am questioning the source of income?
According to The Council for Medicare Integrity, “The Council for Medicare Integrity is a 501(c)(6) non-profit organization. The Council’s mission is to educate policymakers and other stakeholders regarding the importance of healthcare integrity programs that help Medicare identify and correct improper payments.
As a 501(c)(6) organization, the Council files IRS Form 990s annually with the IRS as required by law. Copies of these filings and exemption application materials can be obtained by mailing your request to the Secretary at: Council for Medicare Integrity, Attention: Secretary, 9275 W. Russell Road, Suite 100, Las Vegas, Nevada 89148. In your request, please provide your name, address, contact telephone number and a list of documents requested. Hard copies are subject to a fee of $1.00 for the first page and $.20 per each subsequent page, plus postage, and must be made by check or money order, payable to the Council for Medicare Integrity. Copies will be provided within 30 days from receipt of payment. These documents are also available for public inspection without charge at the Council’s principal office during regular business hours. Please schedule an appointment by contacting the Secretary at the address above.
This website serves as an aggregator of all the verifiable key facts and data pertaining to this important healthcare issue, as well as a resource center to support the provider community in their efforts to comply with Medicare policy.”
I still question the funding (and the bias)…Maybe funded by the RACs??
According to “Report on Medicare Compliance,” dated August 5, 2013, (Yes, I actually subscribe to this Report), the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has BIG changes on the horizon for Medicare AND Medicaid audits (nationwide).
According to “New CMS Program-Integrity Plan Is In the Works; No More ZPICs, MICs,” CMS is developing a “unified program integrity strategy” that will consolidate some Medicaid and Medicare audits.
What does that mean to NC health care providers? Less audits? More audits?
Apparently, CMS intends to contract with 5 – 15 new “unified program integrity contractors (UPIC)…yes, another new acronym… The article also states that UPICs would replace zone program integrity contractors (ZPICs) and Medicaid integrity contractors and program safeguard contractors.
However, according to the article, the Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) will remain in place.
Companies wanting to act as UPICs were to respond to CMS by August 13th. So these UPICs may be effective in the near future.
Are UPICS intended to streamline the audit process (by consolidating Medicare and Medicaid audits)?
Or will UPICS just add an additional 5 – 15 auditing companies, increasing the number of audits on providers, and weeding out providers willing to accept Medicaid to decrease Medicaid spending?
An Extreme Uptick in NC Medicaid Overpayments for June 2013, But Not in Collections! Something Faulty With the System???
Have you ever heard the phrase:
“If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck?”
Similarly, if something looks odd, it generally is. So when North Carolina overpayments go from $10 million to $80 million from one month to another, I think, “Something is fishy.” Especially when the A/R, or accounts receivable does not increase.
Now digressing….Humans are, generally, creatures of habit.
In my life, during my week days, I wake up early in the morning, go for a run with my dog, take a shower, go to work, at some point in the day, blog, go home and eat a family dinner, wind-down in front of the TV with my husband, and then go to bed. Repeat…Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.
In order for me to change my routine (during the week days), it would take a substantial catalyst. For example, if, tomorrow, I won $1 million from a lottery, I would guess that my work day would differ, in that I would, most likely, work less. (Although, in my case, that may not be true, since I enjoy my work so much…but you get the point). Or if my husband were injured or to become sick…my work day would change because I would need to be by his side.
But, generally, my work day schedules are habitually identical.
Generally speaking, the same is for a corporation or a “corporate life.” As in, corporations are run by management (people, who are creatures of habit) so a corporate entity, generally, conducts its business daily in a like-manner…until some substantial catalyst occurs.
For example, a pharmaceutical company would run normally day-to-day, but when a new drug is approved by the FDA and inserted in the market, the company business may change to adapt to the new product.
Recently, I found a graph of activity with overpayments in Medicaid in North Carolina. The graph was created by Program Integrity (PI), part of the Division of Medical Assistance (DMA).
Apparently, in June 2013, the amount of overpayments identified by the State or third-party contractors significantly rose from the months prior. See the below graph:
I understand that the picture quality may not be great. But the title of this graph is, “Original notice of overpayment versus account receivable setup amount for same case.”
This is a graph taken off the Division of Medical Assistance (DMA), Program Integrity (PI) website. The whole report can be found here.
The blue-ish-purple line denotes the original amount of overpayment that was sent to the provider by the auditing entity (whether the audit is conducted by Public Consulting Group (PCG), HMS, DMA or another entity)…or the original amount the provider is told they are expected to pay to the State for Medicaid document noncompliance.
Notice that from July 2012 through May 2013, generally, the blue-ish-purple line is consistent. There is a small spike in January 2013, but for the most part, the blue-ish-purple lines are under $20 million in overpayments identified.
Then we get to June 2013. Holy crap, right??? The blue-ish-purple line went from under $10 million in overpayments found in May 2013 to almost $80 million.
A jump of over $70 million!!! (What kind of catalyst caused that activity?)
A jump of more than the 5 preceding months added together!
What I also find very interesting in this graph is the green line.
The green line demonstrates the amount of money actually owed to the State once the appeals are exhausted and someone, whether it be a judge or a DHHS hearing officer, decides is ACTUALLY owed…or ACTUALLY received.
In June 2013, while $80 million in overpayments were found, less than $5 million was actually recouped by the state. In other words, for whatever reason, over $75 million in overpayments was found to NOT be owed to the State, despite the original contention that the money was owed to the State.
Is the method used by the State (or whatever 3rd-party contractor) to determine the Medicaid overpayments SO FLAWED and SO INACCURATE that almost all the recoupments are wrong?
I get it. No method is perfect. But I would expect to see a method of recoupment that 10-15% of the overpayments were overturned. BUT ALMOST ALL RECOUPMENTS ARE OVERTURNED? (Or found to not be owed to the State).
I would seriously begin to question the method used to determine these faulty overpayments. Or, if not the method, the implementation.
But, be it the method or the implementation…something is seriously wrong here!!!
It may look like a duck, swim like a duck, and quack like a duck…but it, most definitely, is NOT a duck!