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Medicare Inpatient versus Outpatient Status: A Due Process Right!

On January 25, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important opinion in Barrows v. Becerra that will have a significant impact on hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and, potentially, other Medicare providers. The Second Circuit affirmed a ruling from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut that the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) violated the due process rights of a certified nationwide class of Medicare patients that were reclassified from “inpatient” to “observation” by a hospital’s utilization review committee (URC) without being provided an administrative review process to challenge that determination.

Although hospitals (and other Medicare providers and suppliers) are not typically considered to be governmental actors, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) requirements surrounding hospital URCs made those determinations “state action” and thus subject to due process requirements under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The classification from “inpatient” to “observation” can have significant financial repercussions to the Medicare beneficiary. Hospital inpatient services are generally covered under Medicare Part A. Outpatient or observation services are generally covered under Medicare Part B. Medicare beneficiaries pay monthly premiums for Part B coverage and also are subject to copayment obligations under Part B that may be higher than the inpatient deductible under Part A.

The Second Circuit’s opinion has huge ramifications on providers, especially hospitals. This opinion says a hospital stands in the shoes of the government when deciding to charge this person’s hospital stay under Part B. But what if the hospital itself argues that Part A should pay and it disagrees with the patient being deemed outpatient? Well, this ruling gives hospitals a lot more leeway in its finances. A hospital can sue on behalf of its consumer or itself in getting higher or any reimbursements.

The threshold question presented in Barrows was whether CMS’s oversight and control over hospital URC’s reclassification determinations transform those URCs into state action and thus subject to constitutional due process. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, which also included a permanent injunction, requiring the HHS Secretary to create some sort of due process if a Medicare beneficiary disagrees with a hospital URC’s reclassification determination.

This decision may also favorably impact skilled nursing facilities. Generally, a Medicare beneficiary must have a three-day inpatient stay at a hospital in order for Medicare to pay for a subsequent stay in a skilled nursing facility. This three-day requirement is currently waived during the COVID-19 public health emergency. Once the three-day-stay requirement returns, this decision may positively impact skilled nursing facilities by discouraging hospitals from reclassifying patients from inpatient to observation.

Although the district court decision was issued in 2020, the Second Circuit had granted a temporary stay to allow the HHS Secretary to appeal. In the Second Circuit’s opinion, the Court affirmed the district court and denied the HHS Secretary’s motion for stay as moot.

At this stage, HHS has not signaled what due process hospital URCs will have to provide a Medicare beneficiary who disagrees with a reclassification determination. There are also open questions about how to handle potential claims for various members of the class. The class includes Medicare beneficiaries who have been hospitalized since January 1, 2009, had their status changed from inpatient to hospital, received a notice from the hospital or Medicare, and either have Part A-coverage only or had Part A and B and were (or still could be) admitted to a skilled nursing facility within 30 days of hospital discharge.

The HHS Secretary has until late April 2022 to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. At the time of this publication, HHS has not indicated whether it intends to appeal.

AHA Obtains a Permanent Injunction against HHS!!! Raises the Price of Drugs!

Obtaining injunctions against the government is the best part of my job. I love it. I thrive on it. Whenever there is a reduction in Medicare/caid reimbursements rates, I secretly hope someone hires me to get an injunction to increase the reimbursement rates. But injunctions are expensive. So I am always happy whenever a provider obtains an injunction against the government, even if I were not hired to obtain it.

On December 27, 2018, Judge Rudolph Contreras, United States District Judge, ordered the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to increase the Medicare reimbursements rates for outpatient drugs under the 340B Drug Program. A permanent injunction!!!

In November 2017, HHS reduced the Medicare reimbursement rates for outpatient drugs acquired through the 340B Program from average sales price (“ASP”) plus 6% to ASP minus 22.5%. Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,558, 33,634 (Jul. 20, 2017) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 419).

HHS reduced Medicare reimbursements worth billions of dollars to private institutions. HHS has the authority to set Medicare reimbursement rates. But one should question a 30% reduction. Drug prices haven’t dropped.

Plaintiff – the American Hospital Association (AHA) – sued HHS when HHS cut outpatient pharmaceuticals by 30%. HHS contends that the rate adjustment was statutorily authorized and necessary to close the gap between the discounted rates at which Plaintiffs obtain the drugs at issue—through Medicare’s “340B Program”—and the higher rates at which Plaintiffs were previously reimbursed for those drugs under a different Medicare framework.

AHA asked the Court to vacate the HHS’ rate reduction, require HHS to apply previous reimbursement rates for the remainder of this year, and require HHS to pay Plaintiffs the difference between the reimbursements they have received this year under the new rates and the reimbursements they would have received under the previous rates.

HHS argued that AHA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. See blog.

What is the 340B Drug Program?

In 1992, Congress established what is now commonly referred to as the “340B Program.” Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-585, § 602, 106 Stat. 4943, 4967–71. The 340B Program allows participating hospitals and other health care providers (“covered entities”) to purchase certain “covered outpatient drugs” from manufacturers at or below the drugs’ “maximum” or “ceiling” prices, which are dictated by a statutory formula and are typically significantly discounted from those drugs’ average manufacturer prices. See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(1)–(2).3 Put more simply, this Program “imposes ceilings on prices drug manufacturers may charge for medications sold to specified health care facilities.” Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty., 563 U.S. 110, 113 (2011). It is intended to enable covered entities “to stretch scarce Federal resources as far as possible, reaching more eligible patients and providing more comprehensive services.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-384(II), at 12 (1992); see also Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs (“2018 OPPS Rule”), 82 Fed. Reg. 52,356, 52,493 & 52,493 n.18 (Nov. 13, 2017) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 419). Importantly, and as discussed in greater detail below, the 340B Program allows covered entities to purchase certain drugs at steeply discounted rates, and then seek reimbursement for those purchases under Medicare Part B at the rates established by OPPS.

HHS provided a detailed explanation of why it believed this rate reduction was necessary. First, HHS noted that several recent studies have confirmed the large “profit” margin created by the difference between the price that hospitals pay to acquire 340B drugs and the price at which Medicare reimburses those drugs. Second, HHS stated that because of this “profit” margin, HHS was “concerned that the current payment methodology may lead to unnecessary utilization and potential over-utilization of separately payable drugs.” It cited, as an example of this phenomenon, a 2015 Government Accountability Office Report finding that Medicare Part B drug spending was substantially higher at 340B hospitals than at non-340B hospitals. The data indicated that “on average, beneficiaries at 340B . . . hospitals were either prescribed more drugs or more expensive drugs than beneficiaries at the other non-340B hospitals in GAO’s analysis.” Id. at 33,633. Third, HHS expressed concern “about the rising prices of certain drugs and that Medicare beneficiaries, including low-income seniors, are responsible for paying 20 % of the Medicare payment rate for these drugs,” rather than the lower 340B rate paid by the covered hospitals.

The Court found that Plaintiff – AHA – did not need to exhaust its administrative remedies because there was no administrative remedy to exhaust. HHS had ruled that 340B drugs were to be recompensed at 30% lower rates. There is no appeal route for a rule made. There is no reconsideration review of a rule made. Therefore, the Court found that exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile because no administrative remedies existed.

But the most important finding the Court made was that the 30% reduction in Medicare reimbursement rates for 340B drugs was arbitrary, capricious and outside the Secretary’s legal scope. The Court made the brash decision to determine the reimbursement rate for 340B drugs was arbitrary, but could not decide a remedy.

A remedy for an erroneous rule is to strike the rule and have the government repay the 340B drug reimbursements at the amount that should have been paid. But the Court does not order this. Instead the Court asks for each side to brief what remedy they think should be used. They have 30 days to brief their side.