Category Archives: Judicial Review
Knicole Emanuel Interviewed on Recent Success: Behavioral Health Care Service Still Locked in Overbilling Dispute with State
Last Thursday, I was interviewed by a reporter from New Mexico regarding our Teambuilders win, in which an administrative judge has found that Teambuilders owes only $896 for billing errors. Here is a copy of an article published in the Santa Fe New Mexican, written by Justin Horwath:
The true tragedy is that these companies, including Teambuilders, should not have been put out of business based on false allegations of fraud. Not only was Teambuilders cleared of fraud, but, even the ALJ agreed with us that Teambuilders does not owe $12 million – but a small, nominal amount ($896.35). Instead of having the opportunity to pay the $896.35 and without due process of law, Teambuilders was destroyed – because of allegations.
Loyal followers will remember the behavioral health care debacle that happened in New Mexico in June 2013. See blog and blog and blog. Basically, the State of New Mexico accused 15 behavioral health care companies of credible allegations of fraud and immediately froze all the companies’ Medicaid reimbursements. These 15 companies comprised 87.5% of New Mexico’s behavioral health providers. The companies were forced to close their doors. Hundreds of people lost their jobs. Hundreds of thousands of Medicaid recipients no longer received their medically necessary mental health and substance abuse services. It really was and is such a sad tragedy.
Now, more than 3 years later, the consequences of that payment suspension still haunts those providers. Once they were exonerated of fraud by the Attorney General, the single state entity, Human Services Department (HSD), is now accusing them – one by one – of alleged overpayments. These alleged overpayments are extrapolated. So 10 claims for $600 turns into $2 million. See blog.
I will leave Saturday the 30th of July to fly to Albuquerque, NM, to defend one of those behavioral health care providers in administrative court. The trial is scheduled to last two weeks.
Below is a great article from today’s The Santa Fe New Mexican about this:
By: Justin Horwath
ALBUQUERQUE — Executives of three former mental health agencies told state lawmakers Wednesday that they are still fighting the state’s determination that they overbilled Medicaid, and they are expected to repay millions of dollars, even after they have been cleared of criminal wrongdoing.
“Three years after the fact, and we are still plodding through this,” Shannon Freedle, who was an executive with the now-defunct Teambuilders Counseling Services in Santa Fe, told lawmakers on the Health and Human Services Committee during a hearing in Albuquerque. He was referring to allegations in June 2013 against 15 mental health providers that led to a statewide Medicaid service shake-up.
Along with Freedle, executives of the Santa Fe-based Easter Seals El Mirador and Albuquerque-based Hogares Inc. testified about the New Mexico Human Services Department’s continued claims of Medicaid overpayments long after the state Attorney General’s Office announced it found no evidence that any of the providers had committed fraud and many of the firms have shut down.
Some of the providers, meanwhile, say the state’s former Medicaid claims contractor, OptumHealth New Mexico, still owes them millions of dollars in back payments for treating patients before the shake-up. A group of behavioral health providers, including Teambuilders, Easter Seals and Hogares, filed a lawsuit against OptumHealth in state District Court in June. OptumHealth also faces at least three other lawsuits filed this year, accusing it of Medicaid fraud.
State Rep. Bill O’Neill, D-Albuquerque, called the Human Services Department’s actions “outrageous on so many levels.”
Rep. Christine Trujillo, also an Albuquerque Democrat, called for the resignation of Human Services Department Cabinet Secretary Brent Earnest and for “criminal charges to be pressed because this isn’t human error anymore — this is actually criminal behavior.” She is the second member of the committee to call for Earnest to step down.
No Republicans on the bipartisan committee were at the presentation.
Earlier Wednesday — at a news conference in Albuquerque promoting the Martinez administration’s efforts to tackle New Mexico’s drug abuse epidemic — Gov. Susana Martinez made a rare public comment about the decision in June 2013 to freeze Medicaid payments to the 15 mental health providers on allegations they had defrauded Medicaid, the state and federal program that provides health care to low-income residents. The state brought in five Arizona firms to replace the New Mexico providers, but three of them have since left the state, citing financial losses
Martinez said the decision to freeze the Medicaid payments “was recommended by the federal government.”
“But the patients were continued to be serviced and their services were not interrupted,” she said, “unless they decided on their own that they wanted to not continue.”
Asked to clarify Martinez’s statement about the federal government’s role in the Medicaid payment freeze, Michael Lonergan, the governor’s spokesman, said in an email that Martinez was “referencing federal law, which calls for the state to suspend payments and investigate any credible allegations of fraud.”
Federal law gave the state the option to freeze Medicaid payments but didn’t require it.
Kyler Nerison, a spokesman for the Human Services Department, defended the agency’s efforts to pursue the return of funds allegedly overpaid to the former Medicaid providers, saying in an email that the “Attorney General’s limited review of the agencies that had their payments suspended found thousands of cases of billing errors and other regulatory violations.
“Medicaid dollars should be used to help the people who need it most, and if these politicians want to turn a blind-eye to that kind of waste and abuse, that’s solely on them,” Nerison said. “The Human Services Department will continue working to recoup the misspent and overbilled Medicaid dollars as we continue to help more New Mexicans than ever before in both Medicaid and behavioral health services.”
Freedle said he will attend a Human Services Department hearing next week to contest the agency’s claim that Teambuilders owes the state $2.2 million. At issue is the agency’s use of extrapolation to determine the figure of the alleged overbilling. The agency pointed to 12 allegedly errant claims Teambuilders had made to OptumHealth requesting Medicaid reimbursements worth a total of $728.
But Freedle said the Human Services Department used overpayments found in a small sample of claims and multiplied the amount by 3,000 to determine overbilling over a longer period of time, without proving such billing errors occurred. An investigation by the Attorney General’s Office, which found no evidence of criminal fraud, also found a smaller error rate.
Patsy Romero, CEO of Easter Seals El Mirador, and Nancy Jo Archer, who was the CEO of Hogares, broke down in tears as they described the Human Services Department’s “fair hearing process.”
“That’s really and truly an oxymoron,” Archer said.
In a groundbreaking decision published today by the Court of Appeals (COA), the Court smacked down Public Consulting Group’s (PCG), as well as any other contracted entity’s, authority to wield an “adverse decision” against a health care provider. This solidifies my legal argument that I have been arguing on this blog and in court for years!
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the “single state agency” charged with managing Medicaid. Federal law requires that that one agency manage Medicaid with no ability to delegate discretionary decisions. Case law in K.C. v. Shipman upheld the federal law. See blog.
Yet, despite K.C. v. Shipman, decided in 2013, in Court, DHHS continued to argue that it should be dismissed from cases in which a contracted vendor rendered the adverse decision to recoup, terminate, or suspend a health care provider. DHHS would argue that it had no part of the decision to recoup, terminate, or suspend, that K.C. Shipman is irrelevant to health care provider cases, and that K.C. v. Shipman is only pertinent to Medicaid recipient cases, to which I countered until I was “blue in the face” is a pile of horse manure.
DHHS would argue that my interpretation would break down the Medicaid system because DHHS cannot possibly review and discern whether every recoupment, termination, and/or suspension made by a contracted vendor was valid (my words, not theirs). DHHS argued that it simply does not have the manpower, plus if it has the authority to contract with a company, surely that company can determine the amount of an alleged overpayment…WRONG!!
In fact, in DHHS v. Parker Home Care, LLC, the COA delineates the exact process for the State determining an overpayment with its contracted agent PCG.
- DHHS may enter into a contract with a company, such as PCG.
- A private company, like PCG, may perform preliminary and full investigations to collect facts and data.
- PCG must submit its findings to DHHS, and DHHS must exercise its own discretion to reach a tentative decision from six options (enumerated in the NC Administrative Code).
- DHHS, after its decision, will notify the provider of its tentative decision.
- The health care provider may request a reconsideration of the tentative decision within 15 days.
- Failure to do so will transform the tentative decision into a final determination.
- Time to appeal to OAH begins upon notification of the final determination by DHHS (60 days).
Another interesting part of this decision is that the provider, Parker Home Care, received the Tentative Notice of Overpayment (TNO) in 2012 and did nothing. The provider did not appeal the TNO.
However, because PCG’s TNO did not constitute a final adverse decision by DHHS (because PCG does not have the authority to render a final adverse decision), the provider did not miss any appeal deadline. The final adverse decision was determined to be DHHS’ action of suspending funds to collect the recoupment, which did not occur until 2014…and THAT action was timely appealed.
The COA’s message to private vendors contracted with DHHS is crystal clear: “There is only one head chef in the Medicaid kitchen.”
When is sales tax due on your DME-related sales and services? The North Carolina Business Court Weighs In.
Feeling Great, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Revenue
Sales tax compliance may not be the reason you are in business, but consequences can be very serious if you fail to collect and remit sales taxes on a taxable transaction. Durable medical equipment suppliers (DME) should take note of a recent decision by the North Carolina Business Court in which the DME supplier (at least according to the Court) erroneously thought that certain DME sales were exempt from use tax.
In Feeling Great, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Revenue, 2015 NCBC 81 (N.C. Business Ct. Aug. 20, 2015), the DME suppliers did not collect and remit use tax to the Department of Revenue on the basis that the purchases at issue (medical supplies used in sleep study testing) were exempt from sales and use tax under N.C. Gen. Stat. 105-164.13(12)d. That statute provides that sales of “[d]urable medical supplies sold on prescription” are exempt from sales tax. Seems straightforward, right?
The Department of Revenue, however, issued a tax assessment for sales of supplies used in sleep study testing in connection with a diagnostic sleep system machine. The sleep studies were covered by Medicare or Medicaid and were not part of the tax assessment. It was the supplies used with the sleep studies, such as cleaner, sensors, gauze tape, Q-Tips, and the like, that the Department took issue with because the physicians’ prescriptions did not specifically mention the supplies as having been prescribed, only the sleep studies!
Feeling Great’s problem was that the prescriptions did not specifically refer to “supplies” associated with the sleep studies. Instead, the physician only “prescribed sleep study testing for the patient.” Had the prescription included “all supplies as needed” in the description, the court implied that the result would have been different: sales of such supplies would have been “on prescription” and therefore exempt from sales tax.
Feeling Great’s many arguments to the contrary, including that “Medicaid routinely authorizes the purchase of durable medical equipment and associated ‘supplies’ under a single prescription” (which the administrative law judge had found), were not accepted by the Business Court.
It may seem odd to distinguish between a prescription that prescribes sleep study testing and a prescription that prescribes sleep study testing as well as needed supplies for the machine, but it is the distinction that caused a significant sales tax assessment for the taxpayer in this case. DME suppliers should carefully review the prescriptions and be mindful of the Department’s position when collecting sales and use tax.
Another Win for Gordon & Rees! Judge Finds NM HSD Arbitrary, Capricious, and Not Otherwise in Accordance of Law! And JUSTICE PREVAILS!
For those of you who have followed my blog for a while, you understand the injustices that occurred in New Mexico against 15 behavioral health care providers in 2013. For those of you who do not recall, for background, see blog, and blog and blog. These 15 agencies comprised 87% of NM behavioral health care services. And they were all shut down by immediate suspensions of reimbursements on June 23, 2013, collectively.
My team (Robert Shaw, Special Counsel, and Todd Yoho, Master Paralegal) and I worked our “behinds off” in these two New Mexico administrative hearings that have so far been held. The first was for The Counseling Center (TCC) headed up by Jim Kerlin (seen below). And our decision was finally rendered this past Friday!
BTW: It is officially Jim Kerlin day in Otero county, NM, on June 11th.
The second hearing, which appeal is still pending, was for Easter Seals El Mirador, headed up by Mark Johnson and Patsy Romero. Both companies are outstanding entities and we have been blessed to work with both. Over the last 20-30 years, both companies have served the New Mexican Medicaid population by providing mental health, developmentally disabled, and substance abuse services to those most in need.
After both companies were accused of committing Medicaid fraud, and, while, subsequently, the Attorney General’s office in NM found no indications of fraud, both companies were told that they owed overpayments to HSD. We filed Petitions for Contested Cases. We disagreed.
NM HSD based its decision that all 15 behavioral health care companies were guilty of credible allegations of fraud based on an audit conducted by Public Consultant Group (PCG). While I have seen the imperfections of PCG’s auditing skills, in this case, PCG found no credible allegations of fraud. HSD, nonetheless, took it upon itself to discard PCG’s audit and find credible allegations of fraud.
These cases were brought in administrative court. For those who do not know, administrative court is a quasi-judicial court, which is specially carved out from our state and federal civil courts. In NC, our Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is the administrative court in which health care providers and Medicaid recipients seek relief from adverse agency actions. Similarly, NM also has an administrative court system. The administrative court system is actually a part of the executive branch; the Governor of the State appoints the administrative law judges (ALJs).
However, 42 CFR 431.10 mandates that each state designate a single state entity to manage Medicaid. In NM, that single state agency is Human Services Department (HSD); in NC, it is the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) (for now).
42 CFR 431.10 states that if the single state agency delegates authority to another entity, that other entity cannot “have the authority to change or disapprove any administrative decision of that agency, or otherwise substitute their judgment for that of the Medicaid agency with respect to the application of policies, rules, and regulations issued by the Medicaid agency.”
If an ALJ is deciding an issue with Medicaid, then her or she would be substituting his or her judgment for that of the Medicaid agency with respect to the application of policies, rules, and regulations issued by the Medicaid agency.
This is why, in NC, prior to 2013, our ALJs could only make a Recommendation, not an Order or Decision. See blog. In 2013, NC was granted a Waiver to the single state agency mandate allowing ALJs to render decisions on behalf of Medicaid.
In New Mexico, however, there has been no such Waiver. Thus, the ALJ only recommends a decision. In NC, our ALJs are appointed and are independent of DHHS. Juxtapose, in NM, the ALJ answers to the single state entity AND only issues a recommendation, which the agency may accept or reject.
Needless to say, in TCC v. HSD, the ALJ ruled against us. And HSD accepted the recommended decision. We appealed to Superior Court with a Petition for Judicial Review.
Judges in Superior Courts are not employed by their single state agencies. I have found, generally, that Superior Court judges truly try to follow the law. (In my opinion, so do ALJs who do not have to answer to the single state agency, like in NC).
This past Friday, October 23, 2015, Judge Francis Matthew, issued a Decision REVERSING HSD’s decision that TCC owed any money and ordered all funds being withheld to be released. Here are a couple quotes:
Special Counsel, Robert Shaw, our paralegal, Todd Yoho, our local counsel Bryan Davis, and I are beyond ecstatic with the result. Robert and I worked weeks upon weeks of 12-16 hour days for this case.
I remember the night before the 1st day of trial, local counsel encountered an unexpected printing problem. I had just flown into New Mexico and Robert Shaw was on his way, but his flight was delayed. Robert got to the hotel in Santa Fe at approximately 7 pm New Mexico time, which was 10 pm eastern time.
It’s 7:00 pm the evening before the trial…and we have no exhibits.
Robert went to the nearby Kinko’s and printed off all the exhibits and organized the binders until 2:00 am, 5:00 am eastern time. During which time I was preparing opening statement, direct examinations, and cross examinations (although I went to bed way before 2:00 am).
Regardless, Robert was dressed, clean-shaven, and ready to go the next day at 9:00 am with the exhibits (of which there were approximately 10 bankers’ boxes filled).
The trial lasted all week. Every day we would attend trial 9:00-5:00. After each day concluded, our evenings of preparation for the next day began.
I am not telling you all this for admiration, consternation, or any other reason except to shed some light as to our absolutely unbridled joy when, on Friday, October 23, 2015, Bryan Davis emailed us the Order that says that HSD’s decision “is REVERSED in its entirety…”
See the article in The Santa Fe New Mexican.
We hope this sets good precedent for Easter Seals El Mirador and the other 13 behavioral health care agencies harmed by HSD’s allegations of fraud in 2013.
42 CFR 455.23 mandates a state to suspend reimbursements for a provider upon “credible allegations of fraud.” Obviously, this is an extreme measure that will undoubtedly put that accused provider out of business without due process. BTW: the “credible” allegation can be non-credible. It does not matter. See blog. 42 CFR 455.23 is the modern day guillotine for health care providers.
Which leads me to say…It is my sincere hope, that, going forward, state agencies realize the magnitude of implementing measures mandated by 42 CFR 455.23. Instead of wielding the power willy-nilly, it is imperative to conduct a good faith investigation prior to the accusation.
And, certainly, do not conduct an investigation, discard the results, and accuse 87% of your behavioral health care providers in your state. Think of the recipients!! The employees!! And all the families affected!!
Remember July 1, 2013? Providers across North Carolina probably still suffer PTSD at the mention of the “go-live” date for NCTracks. If you remember July 1, 2013, you probably also remember that my former firm filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of the physicians in NC who suffered losses from NCTracks’ inception.
There was oral argument at the NC Business Court.
“Ultimately, the burden of proving that administrative remedies are inadequate in this action rests on Plaintiffs. Jackson, 131 N.C. App. at 186. Although sympathetic to the apparently difficult administrative process, the Court concludes that, particularly in light of the fact that not a single Plaintiff has attempted to use the available administrative procedures to resolve their Medicaid reimbursement claims, Plaintiffs have simply failed to satisfy this burden. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) should be GRANTED.”
While I understand the logic applied to come to this decision, I do not necessarily agree with the outcome. There are exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, which, in my humble opinion, are present here.
(This blog contains my own opinions as to the NCTracks ruling and not those of my present or former firms. It is not intended to claim any ruling was incorrect or inconsistent with case law, rules, and statutes).
(Try to read the foregoing sentences in a fast-paced, tiny, whispery voice, like a pharmaceutical commercial).
Regardless, where does this decision leave the physicians in NC who suffered under an, admittedly, botched, beginning of NCTracks? (Even DHHS recognized the imperfections at the beginning).
First, what is the doctrine of failure of administrative remedies? (I was going to start with what is NCTracks, but you do not know what NCTracks is, you probably should begin reading some of my earlier blog posts: blog; and blog; and blog).
In a nutshell, the exhaustion doctrine dictates that if a party disagrees with an adverse action of a state agency that the party must exhaust its administrative remedies before asking for relief from a civil court judge.
Law 101: The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) has limited jurisdiction. It only has jurisdiction over those matters specifically granted to it by statute. If you have an issue with a final adverse decision of a state agency, you sue at OAH. In other words, if you want to sue a state agency, such as DHHS, or any of its agents, like an MCO, you sue at OAH, not Superior Court. An Administrative Law Judge, or ALJ, presides over the court. While OAH is more informal than Superior Court, OAH follows the rules of civil procedure unless an administrative rule exists.
If a Superior Court were to find that the party failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, then the court would find that the party lacked subject matter jurisdiction; i.e., the court is holding that it does not have the authority to determine the legal question at issue.
You would be back to square one, and, potentially, miss an appeal deadline.
In the Medicaid world this is similar to a managed care organization (MCO) having an informal review process internally which would be required prior to bringing a Petition for Judicial Review at OAH.
Were you to bring a Petition for Judicial Review at OAH prior to attending an informal reconsideration review at the MCO, the ALJ would, most likely, dismiss the case for failure to exhaust your administrative remedies.
But in the NCTracks case, the Plaintiffs sued DHHS and Computer Science Corporation (CSC). CSC is, arguably, not a state agency. The only way in which you could sue CSC at OAH would be for an ALJ to determine that CSC is an agent of a state agency. And, who knows? Maybe CSC is an agent of DHHS. Judge McGuire does not address this issue in his Order.
Many of you may wonder why I opine that CSC is not an agent of the state, yet surmise that the MCOs are agents of DHHS. Here is my reasoning: DHHS, in order to bestow or delegate its powers of administering behavioral health to the MCOs, was required to request a Waiver from the federal government. Unlike with CSC, DHHS merely contracted with CSC; no Waiver was required. That Waiver (two Waivers, really, the 1915(b) and 1915(c)) allow the MCOs to step into the shoes of DHHS….to a degree…and only as far as was requested and approved by CMS…no more. I view CSC as a contractor or vendor of DHHS, while the MCOs are limited agents.
Going back to NCTracks…
One can surmise that, because Judge McGuire dismissed the entire lawsuit and did not keep CSC as a party, Judge McGuire opined that CSC is an agent of DHHS. But there is a possibility that the providers sue in OAH and an ALJ determines that OAH is not a proper venue for CSC. Then what? Back to Superior Court and/or Business Court?
Why do you have to exhaust your administrative remedies? It does seem too burdensome to jump through all the hoops.
The rationale behind requiring parties to exhaust their administrative remedies is that those entities (such as OAH) that hear these specialized cases over and over and develop an expertise to decide the certain esoteric matters that arise under their jurisdiction. Also, the doctrine of separation of powers dictates that an agency created by Congress should be allowed to carry out its duties without undue interference from the judiciary.
For example, Judges Don Overby and Melissa Lassiter, ALJs at the NC OAH have, without question, presided over more Medicaid cases than any Superior Court Judge in the state (unless a Superior Court is a former ALJ, like Judge Beecher Gray). The thinking is that, since Overby and Lassiter, or, ALJs, generally, have presided over more Medicaid cases than the average judge, that the ALJs have formed expertise in area. Which is probably true. It cannot be helped. When you hear the same arguments over and over, you tend to research the answers and form an opinion.
So there is the “why,” what about the exceptions?
There are exceptions to the general rule of having to exhaust your administrative remedies that may or may not be present in the NC tracks case. If you ask me, exceptions are present. If you ask Judge McGuire vis-à-vis his Order, there are no exceptions that were applicable.
One such exception to the general rule that you must exhaust your administrative remedies is if bringing a case at the informal administrative level would be futile. If you can prove futility, then you are not required to exhaust your administrative remedies. Another exception is if you are requesting monetary damages that cannot be awarded at the administrative law level.
Where the administrative remedy is inadequate, a plaintiff is not required to exhaust that remedy before turning to the courts. Shell Island, 134 N.C. App. at 222. The burden of establishing the inadequacy of an administrative remedy is on the party asserting inadequacy. Huang v. N.C. State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 110, 115 (1992).
What DHHS argued, in order to have the case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Judge McGuire agreed with, is:
that adequate administrative remedies exist for all health care providers when NCTracks improperly denies claims.
This holding is not without questions.
Some providers re-bill denied claims over and over. There is a question as to when do you appeal? The first denial? The second? The Fourteenth? At which point do you accept the denial from NCTracks as a “final agency decision?” Do you use the “3 strikes and you’re out” rule? Do you give NCTracks a mulligan? Or do you wait until NCTracks “fouls out” with a 6th denial?
Another question that remains hanging in the wake of the NCTracks dismissal is how will providers handle the sheer volume of denials. Some providers receive voluminous denials. Some RAs can be hundreds of pages long.
Let’s contemplate this argument in a hypothetical. You run a nephrology practice. The bulk of your patients are Medicaid (90% Medicaid, although 50% are dual eligible with Medicaid/Medicare). You have approximately 500-700 patients, who come see your doctors because they are in need of dialysis. You know that if a person does not receive dialysis that there is a chance that the person can enter Stage 5 (end stage renal disease) and die quickly. However, upon July 1, 2013, when NCTracks went live, you stopped receiving Medicaid payments completely. Do you stop accepting and treating your Medicaid patients? Obviously you do not stop accepting Medicaid patients? But your practice cannot sustain itself. Even if you continue to treat Medicaid patients, at some point, you will be out of business, failing to meet payroll, and being forced to involuntarily not treat your patients.
Your patients in need of dialysis come to the office 3x per week. A single hemodialysis treatment typically costs up to $500 or more — or, about $72,000 or more per year for the typical three treatments per week.
Let’s approximate with 500 patients. 500 patients multiplied by 3x per week is 1,500 per week. That is 1,500 denials per week. What Judge McGuire is saying is that your office is burdened with appealing 1,500 denials per week. Or 6,000 denials per month. Or 72,000 appeals per year.
Which of your office staff will be charged with appealing at OAH 72,000 denials per year? The physicians? You, the office manager (because you obviously have nothing else to do)? The receptionist? Hire someone new? For how much? How will you recoup the cost of appealing 72,000 denials per year? How many hours does it cost to appeal one? Hire an attorney?
Obviously, my example is one of an extreme case with 100% denials. But the sentiment holds true even for 30%, 40%, or 50% of denials. The sheer volume would be overwhelming.
And you can imagine the backlog that would be created at OAH.
Judge McGuire’s decision that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies issue appears to be based, in part, that because no plaintiff had tried to go to OAH, plaintiffs could not convince him that the administrative remedy was non-functional.
“Significantly, none of the Plaintiffs even attempted to use the administrative procedures to address the failure to pay claims and other issues they allegedly encountered in attempting to use NCTracks. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that the administrative process would have been futile and inadequate to provide the relief they seek.” See Abrons Family Practice v. DHHS and CSC, ¶ 36 (emphasis added).
Well, first of all, when I moved to Gordon & Rees, I left this case in the capable hands of my former partners, so I have no special intelligence, but I wager that this is not the end.
There are choices. They could:
(1) Appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals;
(2) File an insurmountable number of petition’s at OAH; or
(3) Do nothing.
For some reason, I have my doubts that #3 will occur.
What do you think??? What should the Plaintiffs do now in the wake of this dismissal?
Tomorrow is a big day. Not only will most of us return to work after a long weekend, but the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on a very important issue.
On January 20, 2015, (tomorrow) the Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral arguments on a very important issue that will affect every health care provider in America who accepts Medicaid, and, yet, there has been very little media coverage over this lawsuit.
Legal Issue: Does a Medicaid provider have a private right of action under the Medicaid Act to bring a lawsuit against states under the Supremacy clause.
The Issue Translated from Legalese to English: Can a Medicaid provider sue the state in which the provider does business if the provider believes that the Medicaid reimbursement rate for a particular service or product is too low? For example, can a dentist sue NC for a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate for tooth extractions? Can a long-term care facility and/or a home care agency sue due to low Medicaid personal care services (PCS) rates?
It is my opinion that Medicaid providers across the country have not brought enough lawsuits demanding higher Medicaid reimbursement rates. It is without question that Medicaid reimbursement rates across the country are too low. Low reimbursement rates cause health care providers to refuse to accept Medicaid recipients. See my blog NC Health Care Providers Who Accept Medicaid: Thank you!.
If you hold a Medicaid card, you do not automatically have access to good quality health care. You are segregated from the privately insured and the care you receive is not equal. You are limited in your choice of doctors. If you are an adult, you can forget any dental procedures. Even if you aren’t an adult, you require prior approval for almost all services (regardless of whether you are suffering from pain), which will often be denied (or reduced…or require a significant waiting period). You want mental health care? You better get the very least amount of help possible until you prove you need more help. See my blog NC Medicaid Expansion: Bad for the Poor.
And why won’t more health care providers accept Medicaid? The Medicaid reimbursement rates are too low!! The Medicaid reimbursement rates are too low for health care providers to yield a profit…or, in many instances, even cover the overhead. In fact, providers tell me that when they do accept Medicaid, they are forced to accept more privately insured patients to offset the losses from accepting the finite number of Medicaid patients. In many states, the states refuse to cover psychology costs for Medicaid recipients, and other states refuse to cover the costs for PCS.
So, I say, bring on the lawsuits!!! Force states to increase Medicaid reimbursement rates!!
For example, in obstetrics, if the national Medicaid reimbursement rate for ob/gyn visits is $1.00, here, in NC, we reimburse ob/gyns 88¢. Which is why only 34% of North Carolina ob/gyns accept Medicaid. See Kaiser.
So far, across the country, federal courts have held that Medicaid providers do have a private right of action to sue states for low reimbursement rates. In fact, in most cases, the providers have PREVAILED and the states have been forced to pay higher rates!!!
Providers of all types have filed lawsuits across the country disputing the states’ Medicaid reimbursement rates as being too low. For example, in California, between April 2008 and April 2009, five lawsuits were filed against the state of California to stop scheduled reductions in reimbursement rates (on behalf of rehabilitation providers, nonemergency medical transportation providers, pharmacies, physicians, and emergency physicians).
A Florida lawsuit that was settled in December 2014 revolved around a young boy on Medicaid who was suffering from a painful sinus infection. His mother contacted multiple physicians and was denied appointments because the mother and her son were on Medicaid. He was forced to wait almost a week for an appointment. The judge in the case wrote, “I conclude that Florida’s Medicaid program has not compensated primary physicians or specialists at a competitive rate as compared with either that of Medicare or private insurance payers….I further conclude that Florida’s structure for setting physician reimbursement fails to account for statutorily mandated factors in the Medicaid Act, including the level of compensation needed to assure an adequate supply of physicians.”
Over the years, the Supreme Court has vacillated over even determining whether a Medicaid provider has a private right of action under the Medicaid Act to bring a lawsuit against states under the Supremacy clause.
In 2002, the Supreme Court denied certiorari (refused to hear the argument) on this very issue. Coming out of the 9th Circuit (which includes California), a Circuit which has been especially busy with lawsuits arguing Medicaid reimbursement rates are too low, the case of Independent Living Center of California v. Shewry would have squarely addressed this issue. But the Supreme Court denied certiorari and did not hear arguments.
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided to hear arguments on this issue. In Douglas v. Independent Living Center, Medicaid beneficiaries and providers sued the California state Medicaid agency, seeking to enjoin a number of proposed provider payment rate cuts. After the Supreme Court heard oral argument, but before it had issued its decision, the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved California’s state plan amendment containing the rate cuts. Consequently, the Douglas majority held that the case should be sent back to the lower courts to consider the effect of CMS’s approval of the state plan amendment, without deciding whether the beneficiaries and providers had a right to sue.
Now the case Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center will be heard by the Supreme Court on January 20, 2015.
How did this case come about?
In 2005, the Idaho state legislature passed a law requiring the state Medicaid agency to implement a new methodology to determine provider reimbursement rates, and in 2009, the state Medicaid agency published new, higher rates based, in part, on a study of provider costs. CMS approved the state’s new methodology. However, the new rates never were implemented because the state legislature failed to appropriate sufficient funding, making the refusal to increase the reimbursment rate a budgetary issue. A group of Idaho residential habilitation providers that accept Medicaid sued the Idaho state Medicaid agency and alleged that the state’s failure to implement the new rates conflicted with federal law (the Supremacy Clause).
Section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act requires state Medicaid agencies to take provider costs into account when setting reimbursement rates. Under case law precedent, the rate must “bear a reasonable relationship to efficient and economical . . . costs of providing quality services.” To deviate from this standard of reasonableness, a state must justify its decisions with more than budgetary reasons.
The argument is that the state’s low reimbursement rate for X service, is too low to provide good quality services and that the low rates were set for purely budgetary reasons.
Once you prove that the reimbursement rates are too low to expect good quality care (which would be fairly easy for almost all Medicaid services in NC), then you argue that the state’s reimbursement rates violate the Supremacy Clause because the federal law requires good quality care.
What is the Supremacy Clause?
The Supremacy Clause can be found in Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the U. S. Constitution. Basically, it establishes that federal law trumps conflicting state laws , even state constitutional provisions, on matters within the Constitution’s grant of powers to the federal government – such as Medicaid..
In this case, we are talking about a state’s Medicaid reimbursement rate violating the federal law requiring that the rate must bear a reasonable relationship to quality of care.
This is not a small matter.
After all is said and done, the Armstrong case, which will be heard by the Supreme Court tomorrow, will be extraordinarily important for Medicaid health care providers. I believe it is obvious which way I hope the Supreme Court decides…in favor of providers!! In favor of a ruling that states are not allowed to underpay health care providers only because the patient holds a Medicaid card.
My wish is that Medicaid providers across the country bring lawsuits against their state to increase Medicaid reimbursement rates…that the providers prevail…that more health care providers accept Medicaid…and that more Medicaid recipients receive quality health care.
Is that too much to ask?
The Supreme Court will most likely publish its opinion this summer.
Its decision could have an extreme impact on both Medicaid providers and recipients. Higher Medicaid reimbursement rates would increase the number of physicians willing to accept Mediaid, which, in turn, would provide more access to care for Medicaid recipients.
Keep in mind, however, the issue before the Supreme Court in Armstrong is narrow. If, for whatever reason, the Supreme Court decides that Medicaid providers do not have a private right to sue under the Supremacy Clause…all is not lost!!! There is more than one way to skin a cat.
Throughout my career I have seen more people confuse Medicare and Medicaid than any other two items in my line of work. If I am about to give a presentation on Medicaid, without question, someone will comment, “Oh, that’s important! We will all be on Medicaid someday.” Hmmmm? Really? (I hope not).
It’s confusing. I get it. They sound the same and both are heavily regulated with esoteric rules and regulations.
For the record, MediCARE covers those who qualify for Medicare and are 65 years of age or older. MediCAID serves low-income parents, children, seniors, and people with disabilities.
By providers, I am asked frequently, “What is the difference between a Medicaid audit appeal and a Medicare audit appeal?”
The easy “Audit 101” answer is that Medicaid audit appeals are quicker (although in the legal world, nothing is truly fast) than Medicare audits and that the Medicaid administrative appeal process is easier (or has fewer steps) than the Medicare appeal process.
In Medicaid you have an informal appeal, an appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), and, if you are so inclined, judicial review to the Superior Courts. Obviously you can appeal the judicial review, but most appeals stop at the OAH level.
So, with Medicaid audit appeals, you have 2 levels…maybe 3.
In Medicare audits appeals, there are 5 levels. You have more of a Dante-ish order of events.
In the “Divine Comedy,” Dante writes of three levels of afterlife: (1) Inferno (2) Purgatorio; and (3) Paradiso.
If Dante stopped at those 3 levels, the “Divine Comedy” would be more similar to Medicaid audit appeals, not Medicare audit appeals. But Dante does not stop at 3 levels.
Purgatory, which is the place that the human soul must purge its sins and climb up to be worthy of Heaven, is divided into three sections: (1) Antepurgatory; (2) Purgatory proper; and (3) the Earthly Paradise. (I am giving the Cliff’s Notes version for the purpose of this blog. Obviously, there were other mountains symbolizing the 7 deadly sins and other layers, but I will leave that for English class).
In recent times, Purgatory has come to mean a state of suffering or torment that is meant to be temporary.
Regardless, the “Divine Comedy” and its multi-layers to achieve Paradiso is more akin to the Medicare appeal audit process.
Here are the levels in a Medicare audit appeal process:
3. Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
4. Review by the Appeals Council
5. Judicial Review
Nowadays many providers undergoing Medicare audits are getting stuck waiting for #3 to occur. Purgatory.
So long is the hold up before step #3 that Congressman Jim McDermott, 7th District, Washington, wrote a letter to Secretary Kathleen Sebelius expressing concerns.
In a letter dated March 18, 2014, Congressman McDermott writes that he is concerned with the backlog of appeals pending in the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA).
According to Congressman McDermott, 357,000 Medicare appeals are pending at OMHA. If OMHA decided to set a one-year deadline to hear the pending actions and not counting new actions that would be filed, OMHA would have to preside over 1,027.4 hearings a day, including weekends and holidays.
For as long as I know, OMHA has expedited Medicare recipients appeals. However, while Congressman McDermott commends OMHA for the expeditions, he states that the expeditions are not fast enough, even for Medicare recipients.
Congressman McDermott makes several suggestions as to how to decrease the current workload on OMHA.
First, he asks that the “two midnights policy” not be implemented. Instead, he suggests to revamp the recovery audit contractor (RAC) program. Congressman McDermott states that too many issues are still not resolved for the Policy to be implemented and that the implementation will only add to OMHA’s workload.
Second, Congressman McDermott suggests more accountability for the RACs. He states that there is no associated penalty if a RAC collects money from a provider and the decision is overturned on appeal.
To this suggestion, I say, “Bravo, Congressman McDermott!” My suggestion is that the RACs to pay the provider’s attorneys’ fees if overturned on appeal. It seems only fair that the provider not have to pay legal fees if the provider shows that the RAC was incorrect in its assessment.
Thirdly, Congressman McDermott suggests to ensure the newly instated pause on document requests corrects the problems. CMS has recognized inherent problems with the RAC program and has issued a pause of document requests. Well, Congressman McDermott says make sure you fix the problem before lifting the pause. Logical.
Without question, the backlog at OMHA needs to be addressed. Some Medicare providers have complained of not having their cases heard for years. Imagine waiting to be heard in front of a judge for years….not knowing…
It is hard enough for providers to go through a Medicare audit. Much less appeal and then…………………………………………….wait in Purgatory.
Medicaid Providers: Do Not Omit Information on Your Medicaid Application or NC Ct of Appeals Says, “You Can Lose Your Medicaid Contract Without Notice.”
We’ve all told our share of little, white lies, right? “Yes, honey, you look fantastic in that dress!” Or… “I never think about my ex-boyfriend!” But omissions are also lies. People have told me in the past that omissions are not lies, but they are, obviously, wrong. Even in the court of law, a nonverbal action (or omission) can be used against you.
For example, if your neighbor comes up to you and accuses you of killing his cat and you say nothing except shut the door, you better believe that when your neighbor testifies in court that your “nonassertion” or “non- dispution” (I know, not a word) his allegation will be admitted into the court, or at least the attempt will be made. Even though the “nonassertion” would be considered hearsay.
Hearsay is an out of court statement made by someone other than the testifying witness to be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted. For example, if I were on the stand and I said, “My neighbor told me that he killed my cat.” If, in fact, I was testifying in a trial in which I was trying to prove that my neighbor killed my cat, then my statement would be hearsay and not admitted into evidence. The same would be true if I were testifying that I accused my neighbor of killing my cat and he said nothing. His nonadmission would be hearsay as well…because a normal person would protest to killing the cat if accused and innocent.
However, in the law, there are always grey areas. Sometimes when the “statement” is nonverbal, the hearsay objection will be overlooked. Attorneys argue that the hearsay rule is almost always, in the abstract, phrased in terms of “statements” or “utterances” and the possible application of the rule to “conduct” may not be immediately apparent.
However, CAVEAT, In the world of Medicaid, omissions can cost you your Medicaid contract.
In a recent North Carolina Court of Appeals decision, Powell’s Medical Facility v. NC DHHS, the NC Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to uphold the Division of Medical Assistance’s (DMA) termination of Dr. Eddie N. Powell’s (I know, really? Who’s name is legally Eddie and not Edward?) Medicaid contract based on Dr. Powell’s omission on his Medicaid verification packet to Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC).
In 2009, CSC began to re-verify Medicaid providers in an effort to determine that all Medicaid providers met criteria as a Medicaid provider (yes, folks, this is the very same CSC that has catastrophically rolled-out NCTracks).
In Dr. Powell’s case, DMA informed him, in the termination letter, that if a provider were convicted of a criminal offense or made “any mistatement…or omission while submitting the provider application” that DMA had the authority to terminate a provider without notice.
Dr. Powell’s attorneys argued that the termination was erroneous because “the sole basis for DMA’s decision to terminate Dr. Powell’s participation in Medicaid is the mere existence of Dr. Powell’s criminal conviction.” (emphasis in the original)(Notice, people, that I have not told you what the criminal offense was…that is on purpose. Once I read the criminal conviction, I was tainted for the remainder of the Court’s opinion. So you will find out the criminal conviction at the end. Those of you impatient readers, can scroll down. But, for now, imagine that the criminal conviction is for stealing a loaf of bread for his family. See “Les Miserables” by Victor Hugo.)
The Court, however, disagreed.
A witness for the Respondent (DMA) testified on recross that Dr. Powell’s termination was based on (1) the conviction (of stealing bread); and (2) the OMISSION to disclose his conviction (of stealing bread) on his application.
Supposedly, the result of the this opinion is that if you were convicted of a criminal offense and it does not involve something really, really, bad (such as stealing bread) and you DO disclose it on the Medicaid application that you would not be terminated.
Moral of the story? Disclose everything!
If you were convicted of littering when you were 18, disclose it.
The problem with Dr. Powell? He was not convicted of littering when he was 18. He also was not convicted of stealing bread for his starving family like Jean Valjean.
He was convicted of the felonies of incest and taking liberties with a minor, who is his stepdaughter. (To which my husband, asked, “Is it incest if it was his stepdaughter?” To which, I said, “Hmmmmm. I don’t know. I am not a criminal attorney.”)
Regardless, Dr. Powell is a convicted sex offender.
Interestingly, one issue before the NC Court of Appeals was whether a Medicaid contract is a “property right” to a provider. That is a HUGE issue for NC Medicaid providers!!! This issue goes back to the whole “is a Medicaid contract terminable at will?” Obviously, DMA and the managed care organizations want the Medicaid contracts to be terminable at will so they can terminate a contract without due process.
But the NC Court of Appeals did not rule as to this very important issue. The Court ruled that “even assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Powell’s enrollment was not terminable at will, DMA had substantial evidence to terminate the contract.
However, the moral is obvious. We don’t need Aesop to tell us the moral. If you are a Medicaid provider and have been convicted of a criminal offense in the past, disclose the conviction on all Medicaid applications. Period.